BYU Law Review
Volume 2012 | Issue 5

12-1-2012

Originalism and Loving v. Virginia
Steven G. Calabresi
Andrea Matthews

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Courts Commons
Recommended Citation
Steven G. Calabresi and Andrea Matthews, Originalism and Loving v. Virginia, 2012 BYU L. Rev. 1393 (2012).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2012/iss5/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Article 1

1.CALABRESI.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

2/8/2013 2:56 PM

Originalism and Loving v. Virginia
*

Steven G. Calabresi and Andrea Matthews



TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 1394
II. THE MISTAKEN RELIANCE ON EVIDENCE OF ORIGINAL INTENT ... 1399
III. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE RECONSTRUCTION TEXTS........ 1412
A. Same .................................................................................... 1422
B. Full ...................................................................................... 1424
C. Equal.................................................................................... 1427
IV. PUBLIC PERCEPTION ..................................................................... 1431
V. THE CASE LAW ON RACIAL INTERMARRIAGE IN THE 1870S AND
LATER....................................................................................... 1459
VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 1469

 Professor of Law, Northwestern University; Visiting Professor of Political Science,
Brown University; and Joseph R. Weisberger Visiting Professor of Law, Roger Williams University.
We are grateful to Andy Koppelman, Gary Lawson, and Michael Vorenberg for helpful comments
and suggestions. We also want to express special thanks to John Tomasi and the Political Theory
Project at Brown University and to Corey Brettschneider in the Brown Political Science Department
for creating the working environment that led to this article. We dedicate this Article to Gary
Lawson from whom we have learned so much about the importance of the original public meaning
of legal texts over the intentions of those who were living when a text became a law.
 BA Brown University 2011.

1393

1.CALABRESI.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

2/8/2013 2:56 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2012

I. INTRODUCTION
The question is not what the Senator means, but what is the
legitimate meaning and import of the terms employed in the bill. . . .
What are civil rights? What are the rights which you, I, or any citizen
of this country enjoy? . . . [H]ere you use a generic term which in its
most comprehensive signification includes every species of right that
man can enjoy other than those the foundation of which rests
exclusively in nature and in the law of nature.1

It is widely agreed among legal academics and judges that
originalism cannot explain or justify the United States Supreme Court’s
1967 ruling in Loving v. Virginia,2 which held that laws banning racial
intermarriage were unconstitutional. Originalism is a theory of
constitutional interpretation expounded by Justices Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas as well as by former Judge Robert H. Bork and former
Attorney General Edwin Meese III. Originalists believe that the
constitutional text should be interpreted according to the original
meaning of the words used as that meaning would have been unveiled in
contemporary dictionaries, grammar books, and other indicia of objective
public meaning.3 The critics of originalism, from Richard Posner4 to
Cass Sunstein5 to Jack Balkin6 and Michael Klarman,7 all say that the
alleged inability of originalism to explain Loving v. Virginia, which is
one of the great human rights triumphs of the last fifty years, is a major
blow against the Scalia-Thomas theory of judging. Even the originalist
scholar, former Judge Michael McConnell, who has offered an originalist
defense of Brown v. Board of Education,8 falls silent when it comes to
defending Loving v. Virginia on originalist grounds. McConnell

1. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1st Sess. 477 (1866) (statement of Sen. Willard Saulsbury).
2. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
3. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
144 (1990); see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 23–41 (1997) (defending textualism over legislative history).
4. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 247–249 (1995) (arguing that originalism
cannot support the outcome in Brown v. Board of Education much less Loving v. Virginia).
5. CASS SUNSTEIN, Debate on Radicals in Robes, ORIGINALISM: A QUARTER CENTURY OF
DEBATE 293 (Steven G. Calabresi ed., 2007) (arguing that Michael McConnell cannot offer an
originalist defense of Loving v. Virginia).
6. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 228 (2011).
7. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1919 (1995).
8. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV.
947 (1995).
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evidently feels that there are just too many statements in the
congressional legislative history from the 1860s and 1870s in support of
laws banning racial intermarriage for Loving v. Virginia to be defensible
on originalist grounds.9 McConnell undoubtedly thinks Loving is right as
a matter of policy and that it ought never to be overruled, but he is unable
to say he would have joined the opinion when it was first handed down
in 1967.10
We think the conventional wisdom on originalism and Loving is
incorrect. In fact, we think that a proper application of Scalia-style
originalism and textualism leads rather easily to the conclusion that
Loving was rightly decided. The mistake Scalia’s critics make is that they
rely exclusively on the statements made in the legislative history of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
suggest the framers of those Acts did not expect them to legalize racial
intermarriage. Scalia-style originalists and textualists, however, should
reject the use of any legislative history as a tool in statutory or
constitutional interpretation. Originalists believe that it is the original
public meaning of the words of a legal text that govern and not the
subjective spin put on that text by members of Congress in the legislative
history.11 In other words, Scalia-style originalists should not concern
themselves with original intent.
In our view, originalists think that lawmaking in a democracy is a
public act whereby the American people, their representatives in the two
houses of Congress, and the President all agree on a text, and it is that
agreed upon text which becomes the law. Isolated comments by
representatives and senators involved in the bill drafting process are not
law nor are they reliable guides to what is the law. Such comments do
not pass the hurdle of bicameralism and presentment set out in Article I,
Section 7, and they are often spin that reflects either wishful thinking by
those making the statements or possibly even inaccurate personal views
about what a prospective law actually means.12 Finally, judges should
look to the plain textual meaning of the law as it is written when

9.
10.
11.
12.

See id. at 1018.
See id.
BORK, supra note 3, at 144.
For a non-formalist discussion of statutory interpretation, see GUIDO CALABRESI, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
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interpreting it in the courts rather than looking to indicia of legislative
intent.13
The best indicia of original public meaning come from dictionaries
and grammar books that are widely in use at the time a law is passed.
Newspaper editorials might also be helpful in recovering the objective
original public meaning of a newly enacted legal text. Statements by
senators and representatives involved in the drafting process, in contrast,
will usually be unknown to the general public when a law is passed and
will therefore not be part of the original public meaning of the law.
Members of the public who want to write their congressmen and lobby
them with respect to a law will usually base their correspondence on the
legal text under consideration, but they will not typically have read a
committee report or isolated random statements in the Congressional
Record.
There are exceptional speeches by sponsors of major legislation,
which are widely publicized, and one could wonder if such speeches are
indicative of original meaning. Arguably, a famous example of such a
writing in American history is The Federalist Papers which were
published when the Constitution was up for ratification in New York
State and which may have swayed voters to approve the Constitution.
Even these kinds of sponsor speeches or opinion pieces must be greatly
discounted by the fact that the voters will often know that the proponents
of a law may be willing to lie about what a proposed law means in order
to get it enacted into law. For example, when the Equal Rights
Amendment was up for ratification in the states, during the 1970s, its
proponents tended to minimize its importance while its opponents
predicted that it would lead to a parade of horribles. Everyone then living
“knew” that if the ERA was ever ratified, its proponents would have
promptly claimed that it changed everything while the ERA’s opponents
would have said the opposite. Our point here is that even when sponsors’
reassuring, mellifluous words are widely publicized, as with The
Federalist Papers, this does not mean the sponsors are being honest nor
does the public necessarily assume that the sponsors are being honest.
Just because a sponsors’ speech or opinion writings are widely available
does not suffice to show that those comments accurately captured the
original public meaning of a legal text.14
13. For an excellent discussion of textualism that comports fully with our understanding, see
John Manning, Second-Generation Textualism, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1287 (2010).
14. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Role of The Federalist in Constitutional
Adjudication, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1337, 1348–50 (1998).
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Suppose Congress passed a statute that said the colors of the
American flag were to be red, white, and blue, but that many statements
in the congressional record indicate that important members of Congress
understood the word “blue” to mean “green.” Suppose further that the
public understood the word “blue” to mean “blue” in accordance with its
commonly accepted public meaning as revealed in dictionaries. The
color of the flag in this case would be red, white, and blue
notwithstanding Congress’s intent that “blue” actually means “green.”
We are governed by the formal legal texts that Congress enacts into law
and not by the unenacted intentions of the members of Congress who
wrote those texts. For the same reason, we are governed by the laws our
ancestors made during Reconstruction and not by their unenacted
intentions or expectations when they made those laws.
Intent is a slippery enough concept when it is applied to one
individual but it dissolves into utter meaningless when it is applied to a
group of people like the members of Congress who voted for the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment. We cannot possibly
say what a group so large and so discordant “intended” to legislate, but
we can read the texts they enacted into law with a dictionary and a
grammar book to discover the original public meaning of those texts.
Original public meaning is an objectively verifiable phenomenon that a
court can reconstruct. It is a cousin to the reasonable man standard
familiar to lawyers from tort law. It is possible to say with a high degree
of certainty what the original public meaning of a legal text was, even if
the intentions of those who voted for it were variable and contradictory.
It may even be the case that a majority of Congress could vote for a law
based on a completely inaccurate understanding of what the law meant.
Legislatures often enact conflicting laws as was illustrated for many
years when Congress voted simultaneously for funds to support antismoking commercials and for funds to provide financial support to
tobacco farmers. Why would Congress vote simultaneously for many
decades to discourage and to encourage the production of tobacco? The
answer is that a swing group of voters in both Houses wanted to please
both the anti-smoking lobby and tobacco growers. Both lobbies were
powerful and the road to re-election required pleasing them both, so
members of Congress went on record both against and for tobacco use.
Unfortunately, this type of behavior occurs in Congress frequently,
which is why it is a fool’s errand to look at legislative history to figure
out what a legal text means. Members of Congress often vote for a bill
and then deny that it means what it says because that way they can curry
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favor both with the bill’s proponents and with its opponents. This is
essentially what happened during Reconstruction. Congress voted to give
African Americans equal civil rights with white Americans while
denying this meant an end to laws against racial intermarriage and to
school segregation.
The flaw with all the writing that has been done to date on
originalism and laws against racial intermarriage is that it asks the wrong
question. Instead of asking what the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
Fourteenth Amendment originally meant when they were enacted into
law, the commentators and Justices have asked what Congress intended
to do when it enacted those laws. Commentators have then extrapolated
from the fact that the Reconstruction framers expected their laws to be
consistent with segregation in schools and bans on racial intermarriage to
the conclusion that as a matter of original intent Jim Crow segregation
was constitutional. We agree with Yale Law Professor Jack Balkin that
all the talk about original public expectations is hogwash and that it is the
semantic original public meaning of the enacted texts that should
govern.15 Once one correctly applies Scalia-style originalism and
textualism to the Fourteenth Amendment, it becomes very easy to see
why Loving v. Virginia is correct.
We begin our analysis in Part II below by discussing the historical
origins of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and of the Fourteenth
Amendment to show how it is that so many commentators have come to
the wrong conclusion that anti-miscegenation laws are consistent with
the historical meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. We then turn in
Part III to a discussion of the text of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and of
the Fourteenth Amendment to show why laws against racial
intermarriage clearly violate the semantic meaning of those enactments
using contemporary nineteenth century dictionary definitions. We rely
heavily on precisely those dictionaries that would have been most readily
available to the American general public in the 1860s. In Part IV, we
quote extensively from newspaper editorials discussing the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to show that our semantic reading of the Act
based on contemporary dictionaries was in fact the meaning that was
widely held by the public. This discussion reveals a widespread public
awareness of the radical nature of the Reconstruction enactments and the
difficulty of the social upheaval that might result. Finally, in Part V, we
show that two state supreme courts in the 1870’s held that anti-

15. BALKIN, supra note 6, at 6–7.
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miscegenation laws violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
Fourteenth Amendment. We take these decisions to be further proof of
the rightness of our reading of the Fourteenth amendment. We do not
address the correctness of Brown v. Board of Education in this Article
because it raises separate and distinct issues that we will address in
another article, which is a companion to this Article.16 We do think that
Brown, like Loving v. Virginia, is correct as a matter of the original
public understanding.
II. THE MISTAKEN RELIANCE ON EVIDENCE OF ORIGINAL INTENT
The mistaken reliance on evidence of original intent rather than of
original meaning is quite directly the fault of the U.S. Supreme Court.
When the Court in 1953 directed re-argument of Brown v. Board of
Education, the Court asked the parties to brief the following questions:
1. What evidence is there that the Congress which submitted and the
State legislatures and conventions which ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment contemplated or did not contemplate, understood or did
not understand, that it would abolish segregation in public schools?
2. If neither the Congress in submitting nor the States in ratifying the
Fourteenth Amendment understood that compliance with it would
require the immediate abolition of segregation in public schools, was it
nevertheless the understanding of the framers of the Amendment
(a) that future Congresses might, in the exercise of their power
under section 5 of the Amendment, abolish such segregation, or
(b) that it would be within the judicial power, in light of future
conditions, to construe the Amendment as abolishing such
segregation of its own force?
3. On the assumption that the answers to questions 2 (a) and (b) do not
dispose of the issue, is it within the judicial power, in construing the
Amendment, to abolish segregation in public schools?17

These questions all focus on what Congress contemplated or did not
contemplate, and on what it understood or what it did not understand,
when it passed the Fourteenth Amendment in the 1860s. This is,
however, the wrong set of questions to ask! What matters is not what

16. Steven G. Calabresi & Michael Perl, Originalism and Brown v. Board of Education
(forthcoming 2012) (unpublished edited senior research manuscript) (on file with authors).
17. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 970, 972 (1953).
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Congress thought it was doing when it passed the Fourteenth
Amendment but rather what did the words of the Amendment, read in
light of its predecessor the Civil Rights Act of 1866, actually mean.
The U.S. Supreme Court in 1953 asked for briefing on a set of
questions that might interest a devotee of a jurisprudence of original
intent but not a devotee of a jurisprudence of original meaning.18 Instead
of asking for briefs on the question of what members of Congress
thought they were doing, the Supreme Court ought to have instead asked
for briefs on what Congress actually did.
Having asked the wrong questions, the Supreme Court quite
predictably got a useless set of answers as the opinion in Brown v. Board
of Education made clear. Chief Justice Warren pronounced that the
judgment of history was “inconclusive” because
[t]he most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly
intended them to remove all legal distinctions among “all persons born
or naturalized in the United States.” Their opponents, just as certainly,
were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments
and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in
Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined
with any degree of certainty.19

Therefore, Chief Justice Warren concluded that
[i]n approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868
when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v.
Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light
of its full development and its present place in American life
throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if
segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the equal
protection of the laws.20

In other words, the U.S. Supreme Court asked for briefs
psychoanalyzing the group intent of the Congress that adopted the
Fourteenth Amendment, and when the Court got back the predictable
answer that different members of Congress intended different things, it
threw up its hands in despair and decided the case based on current

18. Compare RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2nd ed. 1997) (arguing for a jurisprudence of original intent), with
BORK, supra note 3 (arguing for a jurisprudence of original meaning).
19. Id. at 489.
20. Id. at 492–93.
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public policy needs. As Alexander Bickel said in another context, “No
answer is what the wrong question begets.”21
The Supreme Court should not have asked in 1953 for information
on what the Reconstruction Congress contemplated or understood. They
should have asked for briefing on what the words of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment originally meant. This is an
entirely different question from the one asked by the Court. Three
generations of commentators have puzzled over the original intent of the
Reconstruction Congress since Brown v. Board of Education was handed
down in 1954. The question is both unanswerable and irrelevant. Number
one, there was no majority intent and, number two, it is the laws that the
Reconstruction Congress passed that bind us today and not Congress’s
unenacted intentions.
The leading commentators on Brown v. Board of Education took
their cues from Chief Justice Warren’s opinion and assumed (1) that it
was the intentions of the members of the Reconstruction Congress that
matter and not the texts they enacted; (2) that the Members of the
Reconstruction Congress clearly did not intend to outlaw school
segregation or to create a right to racial intermarriage; and (3) that those
rights had to therefore be created afresh by the U.S. Supreme Court
evolutively interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment and relying on the
so-called living Constitution.22 This approach is epitomized in Alexander
Bickel’s famous 1955 essay in the Harvard Law Review entitled The
Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision.23 Because
Bickel’s article epitomizes the mistaken focus on original intent over
original meaning, we will summarize his argument and the key evidence
he relies on in some detail here.
Bickel begins by noting that the briefs and historical appendices filed
with the Supreme Court in Brown “amounted to the most extensive
presentation of historical materials ever made to the Court.”24 Bickel
elaborates that “[t]he heart of this mass of evidence is to be found in the
21. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
103 (1962).
22. Among the commentators who took this view on Brown v. Board of Education were
BERGER, supra note 18 (arguing that Brown was wrongly decided); Alexander M. Bickel, The
Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955); Herbert
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) (critiquing
the lack of reasoning from principle in Brown); see also BALKIN, supra note 6 (arguing in 2011 that
Brown v. Board of Education can only be justified by living, evolutive originalism).
23. Bickel, supra note 22.
24. Id. at 6.
THE BAR OF POLITICS
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reported debates of the first session of the 39th Congress,”25 and he adds
that “the debates of the Congress which submitted, and the journals and
documents of the legislatures which ratified, the amendment provide the
most direct and unimpeachable indication of original purpose and
understanding—to the extent, of course, that any such indication is to be
found.”26 Bickel’s article goes on to rely exclusively on the legislative
history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Bickel never analyzes any of the legal texts that emerged
from Reconstruction nor did he even discuss them. Bickel never cites
even a single dictionary or grammar book nor does he make any other
effort whatsoever to recapture the original public meaning of the words
of the laws that the Reconstruction Congress passed.
Thus, the entire body of evidence Bickel relies on in his sixty-fivepage Harvard Law Review essay on Brown is completely irrelevant to a
Scalia-style formalist, textualist, or originalist. The only possible use that
such an originalist could make of Bickel’s sources would be to use them
as aids to confirm some generally understood, socially held, objective
public meaning. Bickel does not use his sources in that way, however,
and he instead treats isolated snippets of legislative history reflecting the
comments of one member of Congress in floor debates as if they were
the law. Bickel’s essay is perhaps interesting historically, but it has
essentially nothing to do with law. Who cares what the Members of the
39th Congress thought they were doing? What we care about is what
they actually did.
The debates in the 39th Congress were triggered by the North’s
reaction to the passage of laws in many southern states oppressing the
newly freed African American citizens in the South and to the election
by Southern voters of important ex-Confederate officials to high public
offices. The laws taking away the rights of African American freedmen
were called “The Black Codes,” and Northerners believed these laws
were meant to relegate the freedmen to second-class social status by
making them not much better off than when they were slaves.
The Black Codes were seen as a de facto nullification by the South
of the emancipation of the slaves, and they were seen in the North as an
effort by the South to reverse in practice its military loss in the Civil
War. The Black Codes

25. Id.
26. Id. at 6–7.
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perpetuated or created many discriminations in the criminal law by
applying unequal penalties to Negroes for recognized offenses and by
specifying offences for Negroes only. Laws which prohibited Negroes
from keeping weapons or from selling liquor were typical of the latter.
Examples of discriminatory penalties were the laws which made it a
capital offence for a Negro to rape a white woman, or to assault a white
woman with intent to rape . . . . In addition to the discriminations of the
criminal laws, post-war black codes hedged in the Negroes with a
series of restraints on their business dealings of even the simplest form.
Though in many states the Negro could acquire property, Mississippi
put sharp limitations on that right. But most restrictive were the
provisions concerning contracts for personal service. Many
statutes
called for specific enforcement of labor contracts against freedmen,
with provisions to facilitate capture should a freedman try to escape.
Vagrancy laws made it a misdemeanor for a Negro to be without a
long-term contract of employment; conviction was followed by a fine,
payable by a white man who could then set the criminal to work for
him until the benefactor had been completely reimbursed for his
generosity.27

The Black Codes thus denied the freedmen liberty of contract and
greatly impaired their right to hold property. The Codes forced free
African Americans into labor relationships, which were scarcely
different from slavery.
The 39th Congress responded to the Black Codes by drafting the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, the first major civil rights law ever to be passed
by the U.S. Congress. On January 29, 1866, Senator Lyman Trumbull of
Illinois brought up a Civil Rights Bill in the U.S. Senate. Section 1 of
Senator Trumbull’s bill provided as follows:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign
power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens
of the United States; that there shall be no discrimination in civil rights
or immunities among the inhabitants of any State or Territory of the
United States on account of race, color, or previous condition of
slavery; but the inhabitants of every race and color, without regard to
any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United

27. John P. Frank and Robert F. Munro, The Original Understanding of “Equal Protection of
the Laws,” 1972 WASH. U. L. Q. 421, 445–446. See generally PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 301–10 (5th ed. 2006) (summarizing
historical origins of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishments, pains, and
penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or
custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.28

Section 1 of Senator Trumbull’s bill thus overturned Dred Scott v.
Sandford, which held that free African Americans were not citizens of
the United States, and it established complete equality as to all civil
rights among the white and African races. Section 2 of Senator
Trumbull’s bill provided for criminal penalties, including imprisonment
of up to one year in jail, for any person who under color of law deprived
a citizen of these fundamental civil rights.
There ensued in the Senate, which passed Senator Trumbull’s bill
verbatim, and then later in the House of Representatives much debate
over the general protection given to civil rights in the abstract at the
beginning of Section 1 prior to the specific enumeration of the equal
rights to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishments.29

The very general opening language of Section 1, which came to be
called the general civil rights formula, provided “that there shall be no
discrimination in civil rights or immunities among the inhabitants of any
State or Territory of the United States on account of race, color, or
previous condition of slavery.”30 Critics of the Civil Rights Bill seized
on this prefatory language, which they feared was subject to a
“latitudinarian” construction,31 and complained that it would go beyond
overturning the Black Codes and that it would give African Americans
the right to vote, the right to serve on juries, the right to attend integrated
schools with white children, and the right to racial intermarriage.

28.
29.
30.
31.

1404

Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
Id.
Id.
BICKEL, supra note 21, at 9.
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The supporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 countered that the bill
gave only equal civil rights to African Americans and that it did not
confer political rights,32 such as the right to vote or to serve on a jury.
Senator William Saulsbury of Delaware, a Democrat, complained:
The question is not what the Senator means, but what is the legitimate
meaning and import of the terms employed in the bill . . . . What are
civil rights? What are the rights which you, I, or any citizen of this
country enjoy? . . . [H]ere you use a generic term which in its most
comprehensive signification includes every species of right that man
can enjoy other than those the foundation of which rests exclusively in
nature and in the law of nature.33

Senator Reverdy Johnson then objected that the Civil Rights Act
would ban laws forbidding racial intermarriage, but Senator Trumbull
and another supporter of the bill disagreed.34 They claimed laws against
racial intermarriage were equal because such laws said that blacks could
only marry blacks and whites could only marry whites.35 The Civil
Rights Bill passed the Senate in unamended form on February 2 by a
vote of thirty-three to twelve.36 The debate on the Bill then moved over
to the House of Representatives.37
The debate in the House of Representatives was heated and included
objections from a number of speakers that the Bill would require school
integration, racial intermarriage, and voting rights for African
Americans.38 The Bill’s supporters denied this and claimed that the
general civil rights proviso at the start of the Bill protected only the
rights enumerated at the end of the Bill which included the right
to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment[s]. . . .39

32. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 476 (1866) (statement of Sen. Lyman Trumbull);
BICKEL, supra note 21, at 13.
33. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 477 (1866) (statement of Sen. William
Saulsbury).
34. Id. at 505–06.
35. Id. at 505.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 606–07.
38. Id. at 1121.
39. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
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Supporters of the general civil rights proviso thus claimed that it was
code for only the specifically enumerated rights and not for anything
else.40 At one point they even amended the Bill to specifically deny that
it conferred a right to vote.41
Bickel says that “[t]he final expression of Republican misgivings
was the most formidable” and most “decisive” because it came from
Congressman John A. Bingham, a leader of his party in the House.42
Bingham wanted to “strike the [language] at the head of Section [1,]
which forbade all ‘discrimination in civil rights [and] immunities’ and to
substitute for” the criminal penalty imposed on violators of the bill a
right on the part of those discriminated against to file a civil suit for
damages.43 Bingham prevailed and the general civil rights language at
the head of Section 1 was struck.44 Representative James F. Wilson of
Iowa, who was managing the Bill in the House, brought the new revised
version before the House and made a very important statement.
Representative Wilson said:
Mr. Speaker, the amendment which has just been read proposes to
strike out the general terms relating to civil rights. I do not think it
materially changes the bill; but some gentlemen were apprehensive that
the words we propose to strike out might give warrant for a
latitudinarian construction not intended.45

Representative Wilson added that the specific ban on African
American suffrage was no longer needed, and he proceeded to push for a
vote in which the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed the
Bill over Representative Bingham’s dissenting vote.46 “Two days later
the Senate concurred in the House amendments,” and “[t]he President
vetoed the bill on March 27.”47 President Andrew Johnson, “[i]n
discussing section 1, . . . conceded that the only rights safeguarded by it
were those enumerated. He did not attack the section on the basis of any
alarmist ‘latitudinarian’ construction. His objections were” based on the
claim that Congress lacked the constitutional power under Section 2 of

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
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CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1293–95 (1866).
Id. at 1162.
Bickel, supra note 22, at 22.
Id.; CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1290–93 (1866).
CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1366–67 (1866).
Id. at 1366 (1866) (emphasis added); see also Bickel, supra note 22, at 28.
Bickel, supra note 22, at 28.
Id.
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the Thirteenth Amendment to pass a general civil rights bill.48 Since the
Thirteenth Amendment banned only slavery and not deprivations of civil
rights, President Johnson claimed that Congress’s power to enforce the
Thirteenth Amendment included only a power to pass federal laws
against slavery and not federal laws on the subject of civil rights.49
The Senate overrode the President’s veto on April 4, 1866.50 “There
were speeches by Trumbull, Reverdy Johnson, Cowan, and Garrett
Davis, Democrat of Kentucky, who was still maintaining that the bill
would abolish antimiscegenation statutes and mark the end of
segregation in hotels and railroad cars and churches.”51 On April 9, the
House overrode the veto.52 It marked the very first time in seventy-seven
years of American constitutional history that a presidential veto on an
important piece of legislation had ever been overridden.
The supporters of Reconstruction feared that the Civil Rights Act of
1866 might be struck down by the federal courts on the ground that
Congress had exceeded its power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment
by passing the Act. This was of course the objection to the Act that had
been expressed by President Johnson in his veto message. Supporters of
Reconstruction were also afraid that a new Congress might be elected
with a southern and Copperhead majority and that that new Congress
might repeal the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Congress therefore set to work
on writing and passing the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was at a bare minimum to
write the Civil Rights Act of 1866 into the Constitution so that there
would be no possibility of it being held unconstitutional or of it being
repealed by a later Congress.53
Thaddeus Stevens spoke in favor of the Fourteenth Amendment as
follows in a speech to the House of Representatives:
This amendment . . . allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of
the States, so far that the law which operates upon one man shall
operate equally upon all. Whatever law punishes a white man for a

48. Id. at 28–29 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1680–81 (1866)).
49. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1680–81 (1866).
50. Bickel, supra note 22, at 29.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Id.
53. This history of the origins of the Fourteenth Amendment is elaborated in John Harrison,
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385 (1992). See ERIC FONER,
RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877 (1988); WILLIAM E. NELSON,
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLE TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE (1988).
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crime shall punish the black man precisely in the same way. . . .
Whatever law protects the white man shall afford “equal” protection
to the black man. Whatever means of redress is afforded to one shall be
afforded to all. Whatever law allows the white man to testify in court
shall allow the man of color to do the same. These are great advantages
over their present codes. . . . I need not enumerate these partial and
oppressive laws. Unless the Constitution should restrain them those
States will . . . crush to death the hated freedmen. Some answer, “Your
civil rights bill secures the same things.” That is partly true, but a law is
repealable by a majority. And I need hardly say that the first time that
the South with their Copperhead allies obtain the command of
Congress it will be repealed. . . . This Amendment once adopted cannot
be amended without two-thirds of Congress. That they will hardly
get.54

There was a widespread consensus that the proposed Fourteenth
Amendment constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866. M. Russell
Thayer of Pennsylvania said that “[a]s I understand it, [the Fourteenth
Amendment] is but incorporating in the Constitution . . . the principle of
the civil rights bill . . . [so that it] shall be forever incorporated.”55
Another congressman, John Broomall described the Amendment as “the
Civil Rights Act ‘in another shape.’”56 Bickel says that “[g]iven the evils
represented by the Black Codes, which were foremost in the minds of all
men, it must be supposed that [the final] language [of the Fourteenth
Amendment] was deemed to protect all the rights specifically
enumerated in the Civil Rights Bill.”57 Bickel adds that “[i]n this
atmosphere, section I became the subject of a stock generalization: it was
dismissed as embodying and, in one sense for the Republicans, in
another for the Democrats and Conservatives, ‘constitutionalizing’ the
Civil Rights Act.”58
One question that immediately arises is how did the language of the
second sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment incorporate
the Civil Rights Act of 1866? That sentence reads:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
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process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.59

The relevant final text of the amended Civil Rights Act of 1866
provided:
[C]itizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have
the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none
other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary
notwithstanding.60

The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment believed that the rights
“to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property,
and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security
of person and property” were all “privileges or immunities” of state
citizenship which no State could “abridge” (i.e., “shorten” or lessen”) in
the making or enforcing of any law.61 At a bare minimum then, the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause included the
enumerated rights in the Civil Rights Act such as the right to make or
enforce contracts. The phrase “privileges or immunities” like the phrase
“civil rights,” which was struck from the 1866 Act, might mean a whole
lot more than just the rights enumerated in the 1866 Act. But no one
doubted that at least the 1866 Act was constitutionalized. Even Raoul
Berger, who was to become famous for his narrow interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, conceded that the Amendment codified the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.62
One opponent of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Andrew
Jackson Rogers, complained:
This section . . . is no more nor less than an attempt to embody in
the Constitution . . . that outrageous and miserable civil rights bill. . . .

59.
60.
61.
62.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (emphasis added).
Harrison, supra note 53, at 1387, 1402 n.53.
BERGER, supra note 18.
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....
. . . What are privileges and immunities? Why, sir, all the rights
we have under the laws of the country are embraced under the
definition of privileges and immunities. The right to vote is a privilege.
The right to marry is a privilege. The right to contract is a privilege.
The right to be a juror is a privilege. The right to be a judge or
President of the United States is a privilege. I hold if that ever becomes
a part of the fundamental law of the land it will prevent any State from
refusing to allow anything to anybody embraced under this term of
privileges and immunities. . . . It will result in a revolution worse than
that through which we have just passed.63

Rogers had a valid point. The term “privileges or immunities” was
obviously lifted from the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 2 of the Constitution.64 It is clear in that context that privileges
and immunities include all civil rights such that one state was obligated
to give to all visiting out-of-state citizens the same civil rights, i.e.,
privileges and immunities, as it gave to its own citizens. States need not
give out-of-staters the same political rights to vote in state elections or
serve on state juries as are enjoyed by their own citizens, but they must
give out-of-state citizens the same civil rights they give their own
citizens. The Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment thus resurrected the general guarantee of equal civil rights
that had been struck from the Civil Rights Act of 1866! Henceforth, no
state could make or enforce any law that abridged the civil rights of
citizens of the United States.
Since the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment makes it clear
that all persons born in the United States were citizens both of the United
States and of the state wherein they reside it follows ineluctably that both
the privileges and immunities of national citizenship and the privileges
and immunities of state citizenship are protected.65 In fact, the privileges

63. Bickel, supra note 22, at 48.
64. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
65. But see The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872); Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive
Due Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1517 (2008). Modern scholarship on the
original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause began with John Harrison’s article
Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, supra note 53, which argued that the Clause
was on an anti-discrimination guarantee and not a fount of substantive due process individual rights.
Philip Hamburger reaches the same conclusion in Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 61
(2011). Akhil Reed Amar and Randy Barnett read the Clause as protecting both against
discrimination and as conferring unenumerated individual rights. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (forthcoming 2012);
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enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, like the right to make and
enforce contracts, were all common law privileges of state citizenship. It
follows a fortiori that other common law privileges or immunities of
state citizenship, like the right to marry, must be protected as well. In
fact, since the right to marry is just a subset of the right to make a
particular form of contract, the right to marry a person of another race
must have been protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, even without
the Fourteenth Amendment, as we shall argue below.
Alexander Bickel ends his survey of the intentions of the framers of
the Fourteenth Amendment by blissfully ignoring the words those
framers wrote into law.
The Senate Moderates, led by Trumbull and Fessenden. . . . [Believed
the Amendment] covered the right to contract, sue, give evidence in
court, and inherit, hold, and dispose of real and personal property; also
a right to equal protection in the literal sense of benefiting equally from
laws . . . permitting ownership of firearms, and to equality in the
penalties and burdens provided by law.66

Bickel adds:
Hence one may surmise that the Moderates believed they were
guaranteeing a right to equal benefits from state educational systems
supported by general tax funds. But there is no evidence whatever
showing that for its sponsors the civil rights formula had anything to do
with unsegregated public schools; Wilson, its sponsor in the House,

RANDY BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 62–65
(2004). Kurt Lash argues in a series of three law review articles, which he is turning into a book, that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects both against discrimination and enumerated but not
unenumerated individual rights. Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause,
Part II: John Bingham and the Second Draft of the Fourteenth Amendment, 99 GEO. L.J. 329 (2011);
Kurt T. Lash, The Origins of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Part I: “Privileges and
Immunities” as an Antebellum Term of Art, 98 GEO. L.J. 1241 (2010); Kurt T. Lash, The
Constitutional Referendum of 1866: Andrew Johnson and the Original Meaning of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2128822.
Robert Natelson argues in The Original Meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 43 GA. L.
REV. 1117 (2009), for the John Harrison and Philip Hamburger interpretation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2. Our own view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment is that (1) it protects against laws that discriminate on the basis of class
or caste and that are not just laws enacted for the good of the whole people; and (2) it protects both
enumerated individual rights and unenumerated individual rights that are deeply rooted in history
and tradition, subject always to the caveat that the states can override such rights if they pass a just
law that is enacted for the general good of the whole people. Our reading grows out of the
foundational case of Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
66. Bickel, supra note 22, at 56.
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specifically disclaimed any such notion. Similarly, it is plain that the
Moderates did not intend to confer any right of intermarriage, the right
to sit on juries, or the right to vote.67

Intend, intend, intend. Professor Bickel’s overwhelming focus on
what the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment “intended” prohibits him
from asking what the words they enacted into law meant in dictionaries
in common use in 1866. It is to that legal and non-psychological question
we now turn.
III. THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE RECONSTRUCTION TEXTS
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment completely transforms
American constitutionalism and federalism. In the first sentence of
Section 1, all persons born or naturalized in the United States are made
citizens both of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.68
In the second sentence of Section 1, citizens are protected from caste- or
class-creating state laws, and all persons are protected from arbitrary and
capricious executive and judicial action and from the failure of state
executives and judges to provide the equal protection of those laws
already on the books. The exact language of section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment reads as follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.69

It is impossible to overstate the import of this broad language.
The first sentence of Section 1, like the first sentence of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, overturned the Dred Scott opinion and made all
persons born in the United States citizens of the United States, including
African Americans. By raising African Americans up to the level of full
citizenship, Section 1 made it clear that African Americans in the South
had the same rights to own guns and engage in free speech as were

67. Id.
68. For a discussion of the citizenship clause, see CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF
FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS NAMED AND UNNAMED (1997).
69. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
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enjoyed by the white citizens of whatever southern state they were
residing in. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV obligates
the states to give out-of-staters the same privileges and immunities, i.e.,
civil rights, that it gives to its own citizens. In fact, the reason Chief
Justice Roger B. Taney was so eager to claim that free African
Americans were not citizens in Dred Scott70 was to allow the southern
states to disarm them and to censor abolitionist speech.71
The second sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is
the only sentence that is addressed to the “making” and “enforcing” of
laws. It provides that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States.”72 What are the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States? It is obvious from the first sentence of Section 1 that citizens of
the United States enjoy privileges or immunities of national citizenship
and also privileges and immunities of citizenship in the State wherein
they reside. We know at a bare minimum that Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866. That means
that Section 1 somehow constitutionally protects the rights to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment[s] . . . .73

How does Section 1 accomplish this goal? It protects the common
law rights of state citizenship, which are privileges or immunities that no
state can abridge. Section 1 and the history recounted above make it clear
that the conclusion in The Slaughter-House Cases that the Privileges or
Immunities Clause protects only privileges or immunities of national
citizenship is absurd. If The Slaughter-House Cases were right, the
Fourteenth Amendment would have failed to accomplish its prime goal.
The text of Section 1, and the history recounted so far, make it absolutely
clear that Section 1 protects state as well as national privileges or
immunities of citizenship.

70. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856).
71. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 237–38,
263 (1998).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
73. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27.
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What then did the words “privileges” and “immunities” originally
mean in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified? Noah
Webster’s 1828 Dictionary of the English Language defined the word
“privilege” as follows:
[Fr. from L. privilegium; privus, separate, private, and lex, law;
originally a private law, some public act that regarded an individual.]
1. A particular and peculiar benefit or advantage enjoyed by a person,
company or society, beyond the common advantages of other citizens.
A privilege may be a particular right granted by law or held by custom,
or it may be an exemption from some burden to which others are
subject. The nobles of Great Britain have the privilege of being triable
by their peers only. Members of parliament and of our legislatures have
the privilege of exemption from arrests in certain cases. The powers of
a banking company are privileges granted by the legislature.
He pleads the legal privilege of a Roman. Kettlewell.
The privilege of birthright was a double portion. Locke.
2. Any peculiar benefit or advantage, right or immunity, not common to
others of the human race. Thus we speak of national privileges, and
civil and political privileges, which we enjoy above other nations. We
have ecclesiastical and religious privileges secured to us by our
constitutions of government. Personal privileges are attached to the
person; as those of embassadors, peers, members of legislatures, &c.
Real privileges are attached to place; as the privileges of the king’s
palace in England.
3. Advantage; favor; benefit.
A nation despicable by its weakness, forfeits even the privilege of
being neutral. Federalist, Hamilton.
Writ of privilege, is a writ to deliver a privileged person from custody
when arrested in a civil suit. Blackstone.74

Several things are made clear by this dictionary definition. First, the
word “privilege” refers not to the natural and inalienable rights
mentioned by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence but
instead to positive law entitlements of particular individuals. The right to
make or enforce contracts or the right to sue are “privileges” but the right
to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” is not. The rights protected

74. 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 43 (Rosalie
J. Slater, ed., Found. Am. Christian Educ., 5th ed. 1987) (1828).
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by the word “privilege” in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment are
positive law rights not natural law rights.
This same conclusion is also reached when we consider the original
public meaning of the word “immunities.” Webster’s 1828 dictionary
defines “immunity” as meaning:
[Fr. immunité; L. immunitas, from immunis, free, exempt; in and
munus, charge, office, duty.]
1. Freedom or exemption from obligation. To be exempted from
observing the rights or duties of the church, is an immunity.
2. Exemption from any charge, duty, office, tax or imposition; a
particular privilege; as the immunities of the free cities of Germany; the
immunities of the clergy.
3. Freedom; as an immunity from error. Dryden.75

Once again, the original meaning connotes positive law rights and
not natural law rights. The privileges or immunities of federal and of
state citizenship are thus to be found in positive law and not in the
writings of John Locke or of other natural law philosophers. This is
confirmed if we examine the etymology of the words “privilege”76 and
“immunity.”77
What sources would an objective reader of American English have
turned to in 1868 to figure out what were the positive law privileges or
immunities of state citizenship? The conclusion is inescapable that such a
reader would have looked at the body of rights that Article IV, Section 2
calls “privileges and immunities” and that are protected rights of out-of-

75. 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 105
(Rosalie J. Slater, ed., Found. Am. Christian Educ., 5th ed. 1987) (1828).
76. See THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 841 (Robert K. Barnhart, ed., 1988)
[hereinafter BARNHART DICTIONARY] (describing the etymology of “privilege” as follows: “n. 1137
privilegie a grant, commission, license, in Peterborough Chronicle; later privilege a distinction,
power (probably before 1200, in Ancrene Riwle), and a special right, advantage, or favor (1340, in
Ayenbite of Inwyt); borrowed from Old French privilege, learned borrowing from Latin, and
borrowed directly from Latin privilegium law applying to one individual, (later) privilege,
prerogative (privus individual; see PRIVATE + lex genitive leges law; see LEGAL). It is probable
that the early borrowing in Peterborough Chronicle was directly from Latin privilegium.”).
77. Id at 510 (describing the etymology of “immunity” as follows: “n. About 1384 ynmunite
exemption from taxation, service, laws, etc., freedom from prosecution, in the Wycliffe Bible;
borrowed probably from Old French immunite, and directly from Latin immunitatem (nominative
immunitas) exemption from performing public service or charges, from immunis exempt from a
service or charge, exempt, free (im- not, variant of in- before m +munis performing services; see
COMMON); for suffix see -ITY. . . ”).
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state residents in a state, which may wish to discriminate against such
out-of-staters. Article IV, Section 2 allows a state to deny out-of-staters
political rights like the right to vote or to serve on a jury, but it does not
allow a state to deny out-of-staters the benefit of state common law or of
state constitutional or statutory provisions conferring civil rights on state
citizens.78 Thus, under Article IV, Section 2, the rights “to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens”79 are all privileges
and immunities of state citizenship as to which the states cannot
discriminate against out-of-staters. These common-law rights are
therefore also Fourteenth Amendment “privileges or immunities,” which
no state can “abridge” while “making” or “enforcing” any law. The word
“abridge” in 1868 meant:
1. To make shorter; to epitomize; to contract by using fewer words, yet
retaining the sense in substance – used or writings. . . .
2. To lessen; to diminish; as to abridge labor; to abridge power or
rights. . . .
3. To deprive; to cut off from; followed by of; as to abridge one of his
rights, or enjoyments. To abridge from, is now obsolete or improper.80

The Black Codes “abridged” the contractual freedom, or privilege, of
African Americans by giving African Americans a lesser and diminished
set of contractual freedoms than were enjoyed by white citizens. This
understanding of “abridge” is also confirmed when we examine the
etymology of the word.81 This is why the Fourteenth Amendment
constitutionalized the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and forever rendered the
Black Codes unconstitutional.
The second sentence of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment also
includes a Due Process Clause and an Equal Protection Clause that were
originally meant to play a subsidiary role relative to the Privileges or
Immunities Clause which was all important. The Due Process Clause
protected life, liberty, and property from arbitrary and capricious

78. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
79. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (1866).
80. WEBSTER, supra note 75.
81. BARNHART DICTIONARY, supra note 76, at 4 (describing the etymology of “abridge” as
follows: “v. About 1303 abregen curtail, lessen, borrowed from Old French abregier or abreger,
from Late Latin abbreviare make brief. . . . The sense “to make shorter, condense” appeared about
1384 in the Wycliffe Bible.”).
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executive or judicial action, but it was not originally meant to restrain the
power of state legislatures to make laws. The Equal Protection Clause
forbade state executives from giving white Americans the protection of
laws against violence while denying “equal protection” to African
Americans.82 The noun in the Equal Protection Clause is protection not
equal, and it is the protection of the laws that the Clause is all about.
After eviscerating the Privileges or Immunities Clause in The
Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court settled on the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as the Clause that substantively
protected individual rights from state legislative infringement, and it
located the Fourteenth Amendment’s anti-discrimination command in the
Equal Protection Clause.83 None of this makes the least bit of sense as an
original matter,84 but the expansive mistaken meanings of the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses effectively undo much of the
damage caused by the evisceration of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause in The Slaughter-House Cases. We only mention this history here
because we are trying to offer an originalist defense of Loving v. Virginia
and doing that requires that we apply the Constitution before The
Slaughter-House Cases mangled it.85
So is the right to marry a privilege or immunity of state citizenship as
to which the states could not constitutionally discriminate in 1868? The
answer is unquestionably yes. State common law rights in 1868 included
liberties of contract, rights to hold property, rights to sue for torts, rights
to testify in court, and rights to inherit among many other rights. The
right to marry would surely have been thought to be a fundamental and
longstanding common law right in 1868.
One way to think about this question is to ask about it in the context
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2.
Suppose a state allowed its citizens to marry their second cousins but not
their first cousins or their siblings. Could such a state have denied an out-

82. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
83. The Equal Protection Clause was transformed from a guarantee that all classes would be
equally protected by state executive officials and by the common law as enforced by state courts into
an additional guarantee that state legislature would make only equal laws.
84. The modern Supreme Court’s construction of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause wrongly implies that a clause about process has a substantive component. The Court’s
construction of the Equal Protection Clause overlooks the fact that the noun in the Clause is
“protection” and not “equal” and that the Clause is therefore addressed to inequalities in the
administration of the law rather than in the making of it.
85. For an apt discussion of Slaughterhouse’s mangling of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, see BLACK, supra note 68.
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of-stater resident in the state the right to marry his second cousin? The
answer would be certainly not! The right to marry would have been
viewed as being a privilege and immunity of state citizenship as to which
no discrimination against out-of-staters would have been allowed.
Similarly, the right to marry, which was the subject of Loving v.
Virginia, would have been described in 1868 as being a privilege or
immunity that the Fourteenth Amendment protected from abridgement.
Could a state constitutionally, after 1868, have a Black Marriage Code
and a White Marriage Code without being guilty of abridging the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States? The answer is
clearly “no” even though almost no-one realized it at the time. The ban
on racial intermarriage limited the contractual freedom of African
Americans in a way related to the way in which the Black Codes limited
the contractual and common law rights of African Americans. Just as the
plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment banned the Black Codes so
too did it ban a racial marriage code.
The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment does suggest
that some of the framers of the Amendment may have understood the
Article IV, Section 2 Privileges and Immunities Clause to be confined to
only the protection of fundamental rights and that they may also have
thought that fundamental rights could be trumped where there was a
compelling governmental interest. Many of the Fourteenth Amendment
framers, when asked what the phrase “privileges or immunities” meant
referred to the definition of that phrase given in Justice Bushrod
Washington’s rambling opinion in Corfield v. Coryell.86 Justice
Washington said in Corfield:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the
several states? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to
those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental;
which belong, of right, to the citizens of all free governments; and
which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the citizens of the several
states which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free,
independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are, it
would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may,
however, be all comprehended under the following general heads:
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with
the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue
and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints

86. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
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as the government may justly prescribe for the general good of the
whole.87

Is the right to marry a fundamental right which, in Justice
Washington’s words has “at all times been enjoyed by the citizens of the
several states which compose this Union, from the time of their
becoming free, independent, and sovereign?”88 The answer is obviously
yes. The right to marry is clearly a fundamental right or, as we would say
today, it is a right that is deeply rooted in history and tradition.89
A closer question may be raised if we ask whether the right to racial
intermarriage is “subject nevertheless to such restraints as the
government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.”90
We do think some restrictions on the right to marry are “just” and are for
“the general good of the whole” which is why we have incest laws and
polygamy laws, which do after all limit the right to marry. Is a law that
forbids racial intermarriage a “just” law enacted for “the general good of
the whole” against the backdrop of a constitutional amendment that was
billed as ending the nation’s racial caste system? It is hard to see how the
answer to that question could be “yes” given that most systems of caste
are kept in place by bans on intermarriage. Obviously, many of the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that the government had a
compelling governmental interest in preventing racial intermarriage, but
it is just as obvious that it was the ban on racial intermarriage which lay
at the bottom of the very racial caste system that the Fourteenth
Amendment was written to extirpate.
Recent scholarship by Philip Hamburger has revealed that Justice
Washington’s opinion in Corfield was an activist attempt by a southern
judge to limit Article IV, Section 2 privileges and immunities so as to
prevent free African Americans in the South from being able to carry
guns or to speak freely against slavery.91 The Reconstruction framers
who trotted out Corfield in the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment may thus have been relying on erroneous dicta in a faulty
precedent. There is, moreover, no reason to suppose that the American
people generally understood the phrase privileges or immunities in 1868
the way Justice Washington had understood it. To the contrary, most

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id at 551–52.
Id.
Calabresi, supra note 65, at 1517, 1533–34.
Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551–52.
See Hamburger, supra note 65, at 93–96.
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Americans who could read the Constitution would have analogized the
Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV—without Justice
Washington’s obscure gloss. The right to marry was a privilege or
immunity in 1868 as to which the government could not discriminate on
the basis of race. Loving v. Virginia was thus rightly decided based on
the original meaning of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment.
But suppose we follow Raoul Berger and Alexander Bickel and deny
that the phrase “privileges or immunities” was anything more than code
for the rights enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of 1868? Suppose we
claim against all the evidence of original meaning set forth above that the
only fundamental rights as to which racial discrimination is prohibited
are the rights “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property.”92 Do laws banning racial intermarriage “abridge” or
shorten or lessen the literal right of African Americans and white
Americans “to make and enforce contracts?” The answer is obviously
yes. If an African American man is told that he can legally enter into a
marriage contract with only an African American woman and not a white
woman then it is obvious that his ability to make marriage contracts has
been abridged. A marriage contract is a contract and just as the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 protected the contractual rights of African Americans
in the workplace so too did its literal language protect contract rights in
family law as well.
Alexander Bickel may have been right that the Framers of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 did not understand that Act to ban antimiscegenation laws, but maybe the Framers of the Act were simply
wrong about what it said or maybe some of them secretly thought the
Act banned anti-miscegenation laws but thought it impolitic to say so
publically. After the general civil rights language was amended out of
the 1866 Act, Rep. Wilson said: Mr. Speaker, the amendment which
has just been read proposes to strike out the general terms relating to
civil rights. I do not think it materially changes the bill . . .93

Let us return to the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, this
time armed with dictionaries, and ask whether laws against racial

92. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §
242 (2012) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (2000)).
93. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1366 (1866) (emphasis added).
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intermarriage violated not only the Fourteenth Amendment but also the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 as well.
The full and final text of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is reproduced
below with critical language highlighted in italics. The Act says:
April 9, 1866
An Act to protect all Persons in the United States in their Civil Rights,
and furnish the Means of their Vindication.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That all persons born
in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding
Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any
previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United
States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and
penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That any person who, under color
of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject, or
cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or Territory to the
deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act, or to different
punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such person having at any
time been held in a condition of slavery or involuntary servitude,
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for
the punishment of white persons, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor, and, on conviction, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one
year, or both, in the discretion of the court.94

To summarize succinctly, the Act says that “citizens, of every race
and color . . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in
the United States, to make and enforce contracts . . . and to full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and

94. Civil Rights Act of 1866, §§ 1-2 (emphasis added) (italics omitted).
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property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.”95 Let us repeat, again, for
emphasis what we just said: Citizens of every race and color shall have
the same right to make contracts as is enjoyed by white citizens. If a
white citizen can contract to marry another white citizen, then it follows
a fortiori that citizens of every race and color “shall have the same
right.”96 This may well be a legal outcome that the framers of the 1866
Act did not “intend,” but it is an outcome that they legislated. We do not
know or care whether the framers of the Civil Rights Act were fools,
knaves, or crafty abolitionists. All we know is what the Act says.
Consider the dictionary definitions of such key words in the 1866
Act as “same,” “full,” and “equal.” The original public meaning of these
words all supports our conclusion that bans on racial intermarriage
violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
A. Same
The word “same” today means an equality or exact likeness of
characteristics.97 An examination of multiple dictionaries resources from
1828 to 1866 shows not only that in 1866 the word “same” was
understood to mean precisely what it means today but also that the
meaning of the word had remained consistent in the nearly four decades
leading up to the passage of the Civil Rights Act. Noah Webster’s
authoritative 1828 Dictionary of the English Language defines the term
“same” as meaning: “1. Identical; not different or other. . . . 2. Of the
identical kind or species, though not the specific thing. . . . 3. That was
mentioned before. . . . 4. Equal; exactly similar.”98 These definitions are
remarkably consistent with the current understanding of the word
“same,” though they are more than a century old. Same means
“identical,” “equal,” or “exactly similar.”99 African Americans must
have the identical right to enter into marriage contracts as is enjoyed by
white citizens. If a white citizen could contract to marry a white citizen,
then according to the plain words of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 African
Americans must have the identical right.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
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WEBSTER, supra note 75.
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The authority of Noah Webster’s dictionary in the nineteenth century
is beyond question.100 While more could usefully be written about the
history of dictionaries and their use, it is clear that in the field of
American English, Webster’s dictionary is dominant and has been since
the first edition in 1828.101 Indeed, Webster’s dictionary remains in
widespread use even today. Webster’s first dictionary, the 1828 edition
we have cited above, was published in two volumes containing 70,000
words, and it included 40,000 more definitions than had ever been
published before in an English dictionary.102 Subsequent editions
followed in 1840, and after Webster’s death in 1843, another edition was
published in 1864.103 Webster’s 1828 dictionary was an incredible
achievement, and one that took twenty years to finish.104 Webster had
already established a reputation as an author of grammar and spelling
readers—his Grammatical Institute of the English Language,
colloquially known as Webster’s Spelling Book, was estimated to have
sold over sixty-two million copies by 1889.105
One concern that a reader might have with our reliance here on
Webster’s 1828 dictionary is the possibility of an evolution in the
meaning of the language over time. The forty year passage of time from
the publication of Webster’s first dictionary in 1828 to the time of
Reconstruction in 1868 is cause enough for concern, but combined with
the social upheaval of the Civil War, it might not be a surprise to find
that definitions of key terms changed between 1828 and 1868. But the
evidence does not bear out this possibility. Webster’s 1840 dictionary
offers the exact same definition of same as did his 1828 dictionary:
“identical, not different or other.”106 Finally, Webster’s 1865 dictionary
also defines “same” as: “1. Not different or other; identical. 2. Of like
kind, species, sort, dimensions, or the like; not differing in character or in
the quality or qualities compared; corresponding; not discordant; similar;
like.”107 Clearly, the definition of the word “same” did not change in
meaning from 1828 to 1865, and it is not different at all from the

100. HISTORY OF THE DICTIONARY (Christopher Wortzenspeigel ed., 2011)
101. Id.
102. Joshua Lawrence Eason, Dictionary-Making in the English Language, 5 PEABODY J.
EDUC., 347, 352 (1928).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 351.
106. NOAH WEBSTER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (19th ed. 1840).
107. NOAH WEBSTER ET AL., A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1865).
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definition of the word “same” today. The etymology of the word “same”
suggests as well that its meaning has been constant for centuries.108
It follows that items described in 1866 as being the “same” were
expected to be identical, and not different in character or quality. In
1866, to say that two groups of people had “the same right” was
understood to have meant identical, not different, and equivalent rights.
The usage of the phrase “the same right” in the Civil Rights Act of 1866
thus recognizes no difference whatsoever between the contractual rights
afforded to citizens of every race and color and white citizens. If a white
citizen could enter into a marriage contract with another white citizen in
1866, then so could citizens of all other races and colors.
B. Full
The second operative phrase in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, “full
and equal benefit” appears in the following language: “citizens, of every
race and color . . . shall have the same right, in every State and Territory
in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, . . . and to full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.”109 One key question is what do
the words “full” and “equal” mean here as a matter of original public
meaning in 1866. Webster’s authoritative 1828 dictionary defines the
word “full” as meaning:
1. Replete; having within its limits all that it can contain; as a vessel
full of liquor. 2. Abounding with; having a large quantity or abundance;
as a house full of furniture; life is full of cares and perplexities. 3.
Supplied; not vacant. . . . 4. Plump; fat; as a full body. 5. Saturated;
sated. . . . 6. Crowded, with regard to the imagination or memory. . . . 7.
Large; entire; not partial; that fills; as a full meal. 8. Complete; entire;
not defective or partial; as the full accomplishment of a prophecy. 9.

108. Barnhart describes the etymology of “same” as follows:
adj. Probably about 1200, in The Ormulum; probably abstracted from the adverbial use in
Old English swā same the same as, likewise, in part by influence of Scandinavian use
(compare Old Icelandic samr, same, sama same); cognate with Old Saxon so sama the
same, Old High German and Gothic sama same, from Proto-Germanic samōn. Cognates
outside Germanic include Old Irish samail likeness, Latin similis like, simul together, at
the same time, Greek homós same, heîs, hén one, háma together, Lithuanian sam-, sawith, Old Slavic so- with, samŭ one, and Sanskrit samá-s level, equal, same, -samá-m
together, from Indo-European sem-/som-/sm- (Pok.902).
BARNHART DICTIONARY, supra note 76, at 954.
109. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (emphasis added) (current
version at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982).
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Complete; entire; without abatement. . . . 10. Containing the whole
matter; expressing the whole; as a full narration or description. 11.
Strong; not faint or attenuated; loud; clear; distinct; as a full voice or
sound. 12. Mature; perfect; as a person of full age. 13. Entire; complete;
denoting the completion of a sentence; as a full stop or point. 14.
Spread to view in all dimensions; as a head drawn with a full face. . . .
15. Exhibiting the whole disk or surface illuminated; as the full moon.
16. Abundant; plenteous; sufficient. We have a full supply of
provisions for the year. 17. Adequate; equal; as a full compensation or
reward for labor. 18. Well fed. 19. Well supplied or furnished;
abounding. 20. Copious; ample. The speaker or the writer was full upon
that point.110

All of these definitions suggest that the word “full” had the exact
same public meaning in 1828 that it does today. For citizens of every
race and color to have the “full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings” as was enjoyed by white citizens would require that they
have exactly the same rights. It would require that if white citizens could
enter into marriage contracts with white citizens then citizens of every
race and color must also have the same contractual right.
As with the word “same,” subsequent dictionary definitions of “full”
suggest that the meaning of the word did not change between 1828 and
1866. An 1840 dictionary thus defined the term “full” as: “a. having all it
can contain, satisfied. n. complete measure, or state. ad. fully, quite,
without abatement.”111 An 1862 dictionary offered a similar lengthy
definition of “full” which we have reproduced in the margins.112 All of

110. WEBSTER, supra note 75.
111. Id.
112. NOAH WEBSTER ET AL., A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1862). The 1862
dictionary defines “full” as:
Adjective: 1. Replete; having within its limits all that it can contain; as, a vessel full of
liquor. 2. Abounding with; having a large quantity or abundance; as, a house full of
furniture; life is full of cares and perplexities. 3. Supplied; not vacant. 4. Plump; fat; as, a
full body. 5. Saturated; sated. 6. Crowded, with regard to the imagination or memory. 7.
Large; entire; not partial; that fills; as, a full meal 8. Complete; entire; not defective or
partial; as, the full accomplishment of a prophecy. 9. Complete; entire; without
abatement. . .10 Containing the whole matter; expressing the whole; as, a full narration or
description. 11. Strong; not faint or attenuated; loud; clear; distinct; as, a full voice or
sound. 12. Mature; perfect; as, a person of full age. 13. Entire; complete; denoting the
completion of a sentence; as, a full stop or point. 14. Spread to view in all dimensions; as,
a head drawn with a full face. . .15. Exhibiting the whole disk or surface illuminated; as,
the full moon. 16. Abundant; plenteous; sufficient. We have a full supply of provisions
for the year. 17. Adequate; equal; as, a full compensation or reward for labor. 18. Well
fed. 19. Well supplied or furnished; abounding. 20. Copious; ample. Noun: 1. Complete
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these definitions are consistent with the modern meaning of “full.”
Finally, yet another edition of Webster’s, issued in 1864, defined “full”
as:
Adjective: 1. Filled up; having within its limits all that it can contain;
supplied; not empty or vacant;—said primarily of hollow vessels, and
hence, of any thing else as, a cup full of water; a house full of people. 2.
Abundantly furnished or provided; sufficient in quantity, quality, or
degree; copious; ample; adequate; as, a full meal; a full supply; a full
voice; a full compensation. 3. Amply provided or furnished; abounding
in; well laden with;—often with of; as, a house full of furniture, and the
like. 4. Not wanting in any essential quality; complete; entire; perfect;
adequate; as, a full narrative; a person of full age; a full stop; a full face;
the full moon.113

In sum, there was absolutely no change whatsoever in the meaning
of the word “full” between 1828 and 1866. In fact, the etymology of the
word “full” suggests its meaning had been constant for centuries.114

measure; utmost extent. This instrument answers to the full. 2. The highest state or
degree. 3. The state of satiety; as, fed to the full. The full of the moon, is the time when it
presents to the spectator its whole face illuminated, as it always does when in opposition
to the sun. Adverb: 1. Quite, to the same degree; without abatement or diminution. 2.
With the whole effect. 3. Exactly. 4. Directly; as, he looked him full in the face. It is
placed before adjectives and adverbs to heighten or strengthen their signification; as, full
sad. Full is prefix to other words, chiefly participles, to express utmost extent or degree.
113. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Chauncey A.
Goodrich & Noah Porter, eds., Mass., G. & C. Merriam Co. 1864). Additional meanings of full in
this dictionary included:
5. —Full and by (Naut.), sailing close-hauled, having all the sails full, and lying as near
the wind as possible.—Totten. 6. Full band (Mus.), a band in which all the voices and
instruments are employed 7. –Full moon, the moon with its whole disk illuminated, s
when opposite to the sun; also, the time when the moon is full. 8. Full organ (Mus.), an
organ in which all or most of the stops are out. Noun: 1. Complete measure; utmost
extent; the highest state or degree. Adverb: 1. Quite; to the same degree; without
abatement or diminution; with full force or effect; completely; exactly; entirely. 2. Full is
prefixed to other words, chiefly participles, to express utmost extent or degree; as, fullbloomed, full-blown, full-crammed, full-grown, full-laden, full-stuffed, and others. Such
compounds are self-defining. Verb intransitive: 1. To become full or wholly illuminated;
as, the moon fulls at midnight.
114. Barnhart offers the following etymology of the word “full”:
adj. Old English full complete, full (917, in the Anglo-Saxon Chronical); cognate with
Old Frisian full, foll full, Old Saxon full, Dutch vol, Old High German fol (modern
German voll), Old Icelandic fullr, and Gothic fulls, from Proto-Germanic *fullaz, earlier
*fulnaz. Outside Germanic cognates are found in Latin plēnus full, plēre to fill, Greek
plḗrēs full, plḗthein to be full, Albanian plot full, Old Irish lān full, Old Welsh laun,
Welsh llawn, Armenian li, Lithuanian pìlnas, Old Slavic plŭnŭ and Sanskrit pūrná-s full,
from Indo-European *pḹnós, root *pelǝ- . . . . Much of the relationship among the
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C. Equal

The Civil Rights Act of 1866 uses the word “full” in tandem with the
word “equal” in the following phrase:
[C]itizens, of every race and color . . . shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce
contracts . . . and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens.115

The meaning of the word “equal” is particularly important for the
purposes of our inquiry. As we will subsequently show, the word “equal”
was used frequently in public discourse concerning the Civil Rights Act.
Achieving an understanding of the word “equal” is thus necessary to
developing an understanding of the original public meaning of the Act.
Noah Webster’s landmark 1828 Dictionary of the English language
defines the word “equal” as meaning:
1. Having the same magnitude or dimensions; being of the same bulk or
extent; as an equal quantity of land; a house of equal size; two persons
of equal bulk; an equal line or angle. 2. Having the same value; as two
commodities of equal price or worth. 3. Having the same qualities or
condition; as two men of equal rank or excellence; two bodies of equal
hardness or softness. 4. Having the same degree; as two motions of
equal velocity. 5. Even; uniform; not variable; as an equal temper or
mind. . . . 6. Being in just proportion; as, my commendation is not
equal to his merit. 7. Impartial; neutral; not biased. . . . 8. Indifferent; of
the same interest or concern. He may receive them or not, it is equal to
me. 9. Just; equitable; giving the same or similar rights or advantages.
The terms and conditions of the contract are equal. 10. Being on the
same terms; enjoying the same or similar benefits. . . .11. Adequate;
having competent power, ability or means. The ship is not equal to her

cognates can be obtained from the reconstructed Indo-European form *pḹnós, as in Old
Welsh and Old Irish, which show the usual Celtic loss of Indo-European p that is found
independently in Armenian, and also independently in Sanskrit r (in pūrṇá-s), which
represents l. The ll in the Germanic words is from –ln- (compare Lithuanian pìlnas) and
is a continuation of an Indo-European adjective with the -n suffix. More immediately of
note is that among the so-called West Germanic languages the o (as in Old High German
fol) is represented by Old English u.
BARNHART DICTIONARY, supra note 76, at 413.
115. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, § 1 (1866) (emphasis added) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982).
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antagonist. The army was not equal to the contest. We are not equal to
the undertaking.116

This clearly suggests that equal is a synonym for the word “same”
and that “equal rights” are therefore “the same rights.” This
understanding persists in the 1840 edition of Webster’s in which the term
“equal” was defined as: “Adjective: like in amount or degree, even, just.
Noun: one of the same rank or age. Verb transitive or intransitive: to
make equal, to be equal.”117 In an 1862 edition of Webster’s, the term
equal was defined as:
Adjective: 1. Having the same magnitude or dimensions; being of the
same bulk or extent; as, an equal quantity of land; a house of equal
size; two persons of equal bulk; an equal line or angle. 2. Having the
same value; as, two commodities of equal price or worth. 3. Having the
same qualities or condition; as, two men of equal rank of excellence;
two bodies of equal hardness or softness.118

Again, there is no shift in meaning. Finally, in the 1864 edition of
Webster’s, “equal” is defined as: “Adjective: 1. Not disagreeing in
quantity, degree, value, or the like; having the same magnitude,
dimensions, the same value, the same degree, or the like; neither inferior
nor superior, greater nor less, better nor worse; corresponding; alike; as, .
. . persons of equal stature or talents; commodities of equal value.”119
116. NOAH WEBSTER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, (5th ed., Found. Am.
Christian Educ., 1828).
117. NOAH WEBSTER, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE ABRIDGED FROM THE
AMERICAN DICTIONARY, FOR THE USE OF PRIMARY SCHOOLS AND THE COUNTING HOUSE 151
(N.Y., F.J. Huntington & Co., 19th ed. 1840).
118. WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 112. Additional meanings of equal in this dictionary include:
4. Having the same degree; as, two motions of equal velocity. 5. Even; uniform; not
variable; as, an equal temper or mind. 6. Being in just proportion; as, my commendation
is not equal to his merit. 7. Impartial; neutral; not biased. 8. Indifferent; of the same
interest of concern. He may receive them or not, it is equal to me. 9. Just; equitable;
giving the same or similar rights or advantages. The terms and conditions of the contract
are equal. 10. Being on the same terms; enjoying the same or similar benefits. 1.
Adequate; having competent power, ability, or means. The ship is not equal to the
contest. We are not equal to the undertaking. Noun: 1. One not inferior or superior to
another; having the same or a similar age, rank, station, office, talents, strength, &c. Verb
transitive: 1. To make equal; to make one thing of the same quantity, dimensions, or
quality as another. 2. To rise to the same state, rank, or estimation with another; to
become equal to. Few officers can expect to equal Washington in fame. 3. To be equal to.
4. To make equivalent to; to recompense fully; to answer in full proportion. 5. To be of
like excellence or beauty.
119. WEBSTER, supra note 113, at 458. Additional definitions of “equal” in this dictionary
include:
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There is thus no change at all in the meaning of the word “equal” from
1828 to 1866 on down to the present day. Indeed, the etymology of the
word “equal” suggests that the meaning of the word has not changed in
many centuries.120 The “full and equal benefits” promised by the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 are quite literally the same, identical benefits as are
enjoyed by white citizens. If white citizens could contract to marry
another white citizen then citizens of every race and color have the
identical, same right.
One question that readers may wonder about at this point is whether
Plessy v. Ferguson121 was correctly decided, in 1896, when it upheld a
Louisiana law mandating racial segregation in railway cars122 Homer
Plessy, who despite being one-eighth African descent was designated as
being black by Louisiana law, was arrested for sitting in the whites only
car on a train and for refusing to move to the car designated for African

2. Bearing a suitable relation; of just proportion; having competent power, abilities, or
means; adequate; fit; as, he is not equal to the task. 3. Evenly balanced; not unduly
inclining to either side; dictated or characterized by fairness; unbiased; just; equitable. 4.
Of the same interest or concern; indifferent. [They who are not disposed to receive them
may let them alone or reject them; it is equal to me.] 5. (Mus.) Intended for voices of one
kind only; —said of a composition in performing which the voices are either all male or
all female. [Rare] 6. Syn.—Even; equable; uniform; adequate; proportionate;
commensurate; fair just; equitable. Noun: 1. One not inferior or superior to another; one
having the same or a similar age, rank, station, office, talents, strength, or other quality or
condition; an equal quantity. Verb transitive: 1. To be or become equal to; to have the
same quantity, or value, or degree, or rank, or the like, with; to be commensurate with. 2.
To make equal return to; to recompense fully. 3. To make equal or equal to; to cause to
be commensurate with or unsurpassed by; to equalize; hence, to compare or regard as
equals.
Id. at 458–59.
120. Barnhart offers the following etymology of “equal”:
adj. About 1390, in Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales; borrowed from Latin aequālis uniform,
identical, equal, from aequus level, even, just, of uncertain origin . . . . A parallel form
egal equal, equivalent (obsolete in English since the 1650’s) was widely used in Middle
English, first recorded in 1380, in Chaucer’s translation of Boethius’ De Consolatione
Philosophiae, and borrowed from Old French egal, igal, from Latin aequālis. Its
derivative in French égalité (earlier borrowed into Middle English, 1380, in Chaucer’s
translation of Beothius’ De Consolatione Philosophiae, but becoming obsolete by 1650)
and thence égalitare was used with the suffix -ian to form egalitarian in English. French
égalité had also been borrowed into English (Middle English egalyte, in Chaucer’s
Boethius, 1380), but it, too, became obsolete by 1650, until apparently re-formed by
Tennyson, in 1864.
BARNHART DICTIONARY, supra note 76, at 337.
121. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
122. Id. at 537–38.
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Americans.123 Plessy argued the Louisiana law segregating railway cars
violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equality.124 By a vote
of seven to one, the Supreme Court held that laws providing for separate
but equal public facilities and accommodations for the races were
constitutional.125 Justice Harlan dissented, powerfully arguing that the
Constitution was colorblind and neither knew nor tolerated any systems
of caste.126
The Louisiana law upheld in Plessy was in blatant violation of both
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It did not give African Americans the same right to make
contracts as was enjoyed by white citizens. Under the Louisiana law, a
white citizen could contract to ride in the whites-only railway car, but an
African American citizen could not make the same contract. The
Louisiana railway car segregation law directly impeded the contractual
and economic liberty of African Americans much as the Black Codes
had done thirty years before. The Black Codes were overturned by the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and by the Fourteenth Amendment in
significant part to ensure that African Americans would have the same
liberty of contract as was enjoyed by white citizens. Jim Crow
segregation impaired that liberty of contract and was thus blatantly
unconstitutional. The Plessy majority evidently thought that it was
somehow possible for the Fourteenth Amendment to ban the Black
Codes while allowing for Jim Crow segregation. This is plainly not the
case. Both the Black Codes and Jim Crow limited the liberty of contract
of African Americans as compared to white Americans, and they were
therefore both unconstitutional for the same reason. There is no
“daylight” between the Black Codes and Jim Crow such that the
Fourteenth Amendment could somehow ban the one without also
banning the other. Plessy v. Ferguson was thus wrong on the day it was
decided in 1896.
We have now shown that whatever the intent was of the 39th
Congress when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
Fourteenth Amendment, the semantic meaning of those enactments
clearly forbade both anti-miscegenation laws and Jim Crow segregation.
The Reconstruction legislators passed laws that were far more sweeping

123.
124.
125.
126.
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than many members of Congress may have realized at the time. We now
turn to the public discussion of these texts in prominent newspapers in
major cities at the time the texts were enacted. This discussion shows
that many citizens appreciated the sweeping nature of the enactments in
question. The original public meaning of the Reconstruction texts as it is
revealed in the newspaper debates is quite consistent with the semantic
dictionary meaning we have just discussed in the material above.
IV. PUBLIC PERCEPTION
It is clear to a student of the history of Reconstruction that at the end
of the Civil War the nation found itself in the largest societal experiment
since the Founding. The rebuilding and integration of the northern and
southern states presented gargantuan social, political, and economic
challenges. The status of newly freed slaves and their integration into, or
the creation of, slave-less societies in the South and elsewhere was just
one set of issues presented at the end of the Civil War. The fate of the
freed men and women in the South represented a moral challenge to the
nation. Reconstruction began hopefully under President Abraham
Lincoln only to devolve into President Andrew Johnson’s fraught and
accommodating treatment of southern states, which led ultimately to the
passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The proponents of
equal rights for the freed slaves began by arguing for equal common law
rights, they moved to arguing for equality in civil rights, and they ended
Reconstruction favoring equal political rights127 and opposing school
segregation.128 The opponents of equal rights for the freed slaves made
their opposition clear first with the passage of the Black Codes and later
with the passage of Jim Crow laws. The end result was a gradual (and
shamefully slow) broadening of the classes and content of rights
available to African Americans. Though it took more than a century to
accomplish what should have been done immediately the end of the Civil
War, the question we address here is exactly when full equality as to civil
rights was mandated by the letter of the law.
The history of Reconstruction shows that there was no consensus
about the scope and substance of rights for African Americans in 1865,
even among elected Republicans and New England abolitionists.129
While the content of the rights properly afforded to freedmen was

127. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
128. See McConnell, supra note 8, at 1093–1100.
129. See FONER, supra note 53.

1431

1.CALABRESI.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/8/2013 2:56 PM

2012

debated throughout Reconstruction, there was a steady movement
between 1865 and 1877 toward greater protection of the rights of African
Americans. This is shown most dramatically by the adoption of the
Fifteenth Amendment giving African American men the right to vote in
1870 when a mere four years earlier the Congress that had passed the
Fourteenth Amendment was opposed to voting rights for African
Americans. Indeed, while in 1870 the expansion of suffrage to freedmen
was passed with constitutional supermajorities in Congress and the
ratifying states, measures to extend the franchise in 1865 were met with
procedural hang-ups in Congress and overwhelming disapproval in the
popular electorate.130 The process of extending equal rights to African
Americans began with the common law rights conferred by the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, broadened into the conferral of equal civil rights in
the Fourteenth Amendment, and culminated with the granting of equal
political rights in the Fifteenth Amendment. As Senator Lyman Trumbull
explained in defending the Civil Rights Act:
But, sir, the granting of civil rights does not, and never did, in this
country carry with it political privileges. A man may be a citizen in this
country without a right to vote or without a right to hold office. The
right to vote and to hold office in the States depends upon the
legislation of the various States. The right to hold certain offices under
the federal government depends upon the Constitution of the United
States . . . . So that the fact of being a citizen does not necessarily
qualify a person for an office, nor does it necessarily authorize him to
vote. Women are citizens, children are citizens, but they do not exercise
the elective franchise by virtue of their citizenship.131

Thanks to the focus of the Black Codes on limiting the economic
freedom of African Americans, the first civil rights guaranteed African
Americans were related to freedom of economic opportunity through
rights to labor and to make and enforce contracts. In the immediate

130. In December 1865, a popular referendum was held in the District of Columbia which put
enfranchisement of the freedmen to a vote. Thirty-five votes were tallied in favor of suffrage, and
6951 were tallied against it. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 74 app. at 217 (1866); DAVID
HERBERT DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER 239–41 (1996); FONER, supra note 53, at 240 (citing
GEORGES CLEMENCEAU, AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION 1865–1870, at 63 (1928)); CONSTANCE
MCLAUGHLIN GREEN, THE SECRET CITY: A HISTORY OF RACE RELATIONS IN THE NATION’S
CAPITAL 75–77 (1967); MICHAEL LES BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCIPLE: CONGRESSIONAL
REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1863–1869, at 141–46 (1st ed. 1974); HANS L. TREFOUSSE,
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN WADE: RADICAL REPUBLICAN FROM OHIO 263 (1963).
131. Lyman Trumbull in a response to President Johnson’s Veto of the Civil Rights Act.
Lyman Trumbull (1866) reprinted in BOS. DAILY J., Apr. 6, 1866.
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months after the end of the Civil War, all eyes were fixed on economic
freedom, which the freedmen viewed as a necessary component of
liberty. In the words of radical Republican Benjamin F. Flanders, the
freedmen were bedeviled by the fact that Democrats devoted “[t]heir
whole thought and time . . . to plans for getting things back as near to
slavery as possible.”132 The earliest fights over civil rights thus focused
on the interrelated rights to labor, freedom of movement, and freedom of
contract, as unsympathetic state and local governments enacted
limitations on the forms of employment available to freedmen and strict
penalties for crimes like vagrancy.133 These laws, the earliest of the
Black Codes, virtually banned African Americans from working as
anything but farmers and servants.134 Some of the Black Codes provided
for sweeping punishments for those who violated them, which could then
be used to return convicted offenders to a state of servitude.135 An
example can be found in a code enacted in 1865 by the state of Alabama,
which defined vagrants as including “a stubborn or refractory servant; a
laborer or servant who loiters away his time, or refuses to comply with
any contract for a term of service without just cause” and provided that
the punishment for vagrancy should not exceed “hard labor, either in or
out of [a poor-house or house of correction], the use of chain-gangs,
putting in stocks . . .”136 Under the Black Codes, families were split apart
(as had happened under slavery) because parents were deemed incapable
of caring for their children. The children in these cases would then be
bound to work as unpaid apprentices sometimes for their white former
slave owners without the consent of the youth’s parents.137
The actions by southern legislatures to reinvent slavery as a legal
institution with the Black Codes led directly to the text of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. We see in the text of the Act a direct response to the
challenges posed by the Black Codes. The Civil Rights Act’s guarantee
to African Americans of “the same right[s] . . . as is enjoyed by white
citizens” “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey . . . property”

132. FONER, supra note 53, at 199 (quoting Letter from Benjamin F. Flanders to Henry C.
Warmoth, (Nov. 23, 1865), in WARMOTH PAPERS).
133. Id. at 198–203.
134. Id. at 200.
135. ALABAMA BLACK CODES, NO. 112 (transcribed from microfiche), available at
http://home. gwu.edu/~jjhawkin/BlackCodes/BlackCodes.htm.
136. Id.
137. FONER, supra note 53, at 201.
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enshrines in federal law the exact civil rights that southern legislatures
associated with economic freedom and attempted to abridge in order to
reintroduce a form of de facto slavery.138 The Civil Rights Act’s
provision that all citizens “shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and
penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or
custom, to the contrary notwithstanding”139 can be understood as a
rebuke to southern courts that imposed penalties aimed at condemning
freedmen to involuntary servitude and uncompensated menial labor for
violations of the Black Codes. Finally, the Civil Rights Act of 1866’s
provision “[t]hat the district courts of the United States, within their
respective districts, shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several
States, cognizance of all crimes and offences committed against the
provisions of this act”140 extended the protection of federal courts as a
haven from the bias of southern judges and juries. Though limited in
scope to civil rights involving economic opportunity, the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 was clearly understood to be a rebuke to the attempts of
southern legislatures to reinstate slavery through a patchwork of labor
and vagrancy laws.
The original public meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 has been
the subject of dispute. Dictionary definitions, as we have seen, compel
the conclusion that anti-miscegenation laws violated the Act. The
objective meaning of the words in the Act being clear, we turn now to
evidence that the general public understood the Act as having the
meaning that dictionary definitions suggest. To establish this, we look at
editorials about the Act published in the leading newspapers of the time.
Newspaper editorials played a key role in the public debates over the
Act during the time it was under consideration by Congress. We look
here at editorials in the most widely circulated newspapers in the five
most populous American cities at that time: Baltimore, Boston, New
York, Philadelphia, and Saint Louis.141 We find that, although there was
disagreement as to whether the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was a good idea
as a matter of public policy, the interpretation of the Act as conferring

138. Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, § 1 (1866).
139. Id.
140. Id. § 3.
141. Baltimore had a population of 212,000 in 1860 and 267,000 in 1870. Boston had a
population of 178,000 in 1860 and 251,000 in 1870. New York had a population of 175,000 in 1860
and 1,478,000 in 1870. Philadelphia had a population of 566,000 in 1860 and 674,000 in 1870. Saint
Louis had a population of 161,000 in 1860 and 311,000 in 1870. B.R. MITCHELL, INTERNATIONAL
HISTORICAL STATISTICS: THE AMERICAS 1750–2005, at 46–48 (6th ed. 2007).
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the same common law civil rights on all citizens without regard to race
was broadly accepted across the country. We look at statements by both
the proponents and the opponents of the Act and find that both groups
thought the Act mandated equality of common law civil rights.
The earliest press coverage of the Civil Rights Bill focused on its use
of terms like “the same right,” “full and equal benefit,” and “there shall
be no discrimination”—terms which we have just shown suggest antimiscegenation laws were banned by the Act. These editorials, published
in January of 1866, show that the public debate over the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 began with a full realization of the fact that the law was an
equalizing measure that sought the exact same rights for all citizens of
the United States. Thus, the Philadelphia Inquirer describe the content of
the Act as follows on January 4, 1866:
The [civil rights] bill is of a permanent character and applicable to all
parts of the United States. It declares that the inhabitants of every race
and color, without regard to former slavery, shall have the same right to
make and inforce contracts, sue, be parties, give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property, to full
and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person
and property, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains and
penalties, and none other, any law, statute, regulation or custom to the
contrary notwithstanding.
Other provisions of the bill make it a criminal offense for any person
under color of law or custom to deprive another of his civil rights and
immunities, give the United States Courts exclusive jurisdiction of the
cases of all persons thus discriminated against, and of all offenses
committed against the provisions of the act; make it the duty of the
judicial authorities of the United States, aided, if necessary, by the
military forces, to execute the law and provide all the machinery for
making the bill effective.
Nearly all the provisions of the old fugitive slave act are incorporated
into this bill, and the statute originally devised to keep in slavery is now
reversed to secure their freedom.142

The general public in New York and Philadelphia was thus informed
of the content and language of the Act.143 The need for the Civil Rights

142. Senator Trumbull’s Bill, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan. 5, 1866; see also The Freedmen’s
Bureau and the Protection of Civil Rights, N.Y. TRIBUNE, Jan. 5, 1866.
143. See The Bill to Protect All Persons in their Civil Rights, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Jan.
30, 1866. The Philadelphia Inquirer adds on January 30, 1866:
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Act of 1866 was explained to readers in the following language from the
New York Tribune on February 5, 1866:
Mr. Trumbull’s two bills—to enlarge the powers of the Freedmen’s
Bureau, and to protect all the American People in their natural civil
rights—are notoriously demanded by and adapted to our existing state
of facts. If the laws and usages of the Southern States were just and
equal, they would be superfluous. They are needed simply because at
the South a Black man, solely because he is Black, is denied the
common rights of human beings—is treated as having no rights that
Whites are bound to respect. The laws of the South, and still more the
dominant opinion and spirit of the South, treat the Blacks as brutes
rather than men. All this will pass away; but meantime, a good many of
the humbler race will be starved or lashed to death, unless Congress
shall protect them. This, and nothing more, is what Mr. Trumbull’s
bills aim to do—what they seem admirably calculated to do; and
Congress is not merely justified in passing them—it could not fail to do
so without a gross and cruel violation of public faith.144

Subsequent editorial content in favor of the bill not only concurred
on its meaning, but also on its purpose in constructing a freer and fair
society for the freedmen in every state. Citizens across the country were
aware of the immense discrimination in the South and of the fact that the
Black Codes were intended to re-subjugate the African American
population. But editorial writers were also aware of racially
discriminatory statutes in northern states and in the territories that
violated the provisions of the Civil Rights Bill, and editorialists accepted
that the bill, if enacted, would nullify these discriminatory measures as
well. Remarkably, supporters recognized the necessity of removing these

Mr. Trumbull called up the bill to protect all persons in the enjoyment of their civil rights,
and to furnish the means of their vindication. It provides that there shall be no
discrimination in civil rights or immunities among the inhabitants of any State or
Territory of the United States on account of race, color or previous condition of slavery;
but the inhabitants of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of
slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real
and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of person and property, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains and
penalties, and to none other; any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to the
contrary notwithstanding. The remainder of the bill prescribes punishments for the
violation of the above provision by fine and imprisonment.
Id.
144. Denunciation of Congress, N.Y. TRIBUNE, Feb. 5, 1866.
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racially discriminatory laws in order to create a more just and cohesive
society. These sentiments were best captured in the North American and
United States Gazette on February 5, 1866, which wrote as follows:
On Friday last the United States Senate passed an act, introduced by
Mr. Trumbull, of Illinois, to guarantee civil liberty to all the people of
the United States, the importance of which cannot easily be
exaggerated. . . . [I]t was so clearly demanded by the present condition
of affairs at the south, that various attempts at accomplishing the same
purpose have been made this session in both houses of Congress. This
one of Mr. Trumbull is thoroughly elaborated, and superior to all the
rest of the measures pending . . . . The House is devoting its attention to
constitutional amendments, two of which it has already passed, while
the Senate has passed two statutes intended to apply to evils at the
south.
Of these the one now before us is much the most important, although it
could hardly be carried into effect without the other, which provides the
machinery for the purpose, by extending the operations of the
Freedmen’s Bureau . . . .
The first section of the bill declares to be citizens of the United States
all men born in its limits, not subject to any foreign Power, excluding
Indians not taxed, and orders that there shall be no discrimination in
civil rights or immunities among the inhabitants of any State or
territory in the republic on account of race, color or previous condition
of slavery, and that all shall have the same right to make and to enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property, and be entitled to full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains and penalties,
and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to
the contrary notwithstanding.
This section states the whole matter at issue at this time, for if these
things were guaranteed by the south voluntarily, all trouble would be
ended and the reign of harmony prevail everywhere. It is precisely
because they are not so guaranteed by the revolted States that the
national government is perplexed to know how to deal with the
subject. . . . Even in States where partial concessions have been made,
codes of laws to regulate the freed men have been passed most
barbarous in their character. It is plain, then, that this statute of Senator
Trumbull supplements the policy of President Johnson—takes up the
work where the conquered rebels stopped short, and carries it through
to the end.
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[I]t nullifies at one stroke all the whole mass of black codes the
rebellious States have been so carefully cooking up since the recovery
of their State powers, to keep the black race in hopeless servitude. It
recognizes all persons born under our flag to be citizens of the United
States, so that for the first time in our history the entire colored race
will be, in the eye of the law, people with a birthright of freedom and
civil equality before the law. It is not alone in the south where this will
be felt. States like Oregon and Indiana, which still maintain black
codes, will find them annulled by this act, for as the Constitution
guarantees to the citizens of any one State the liberty to go freely into
any other State, statutes of exclusion, such as disgrace the codes of
Oregon and Indiana, are not less obnoxious to the provisions of this act
than the black codes of South Carolina and Mississippi.
We presume that suffrage, being a political and not a civil right, is not
included by the words of the bill, within the civil rights granted to all
by its first section, although we perceive that some of our
cotemporaries suppose so. The section particularizes in detail all the
civil rights and immunities intended to be guaranteed, and suffrage is
not among them. . . .
Altogether, this is a most important bill, and one destined to work a
thorough change in the condition of affairs, if properly enforced, as we
cannot doubt it will be. It is thorough and stringent, but not a bit too
much so.145

Again, this editorial is striking in that it recognizes both that the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 created full equality of civil rights, although not of
political rights, and that the Act would lead to changes in the law in
Indiana and Oregon in so far as those states discriminated against
African Americans. There is no hint here that the states would retain a
power to pass Jim Crow laws.
Two days after the publication of this remarkable editorial, the
Boston Daily Journal, wrote on February 7, 1866:
The passage of the bill shows the noble determination of Congress to
provide for the security and rights of the emancipated race, and to
watch over their interests in the transition from slavery to freedom amid
the prejudices and the resentment of their [unreadable] masters. There
has already been a revival of much old pro-slavery legislation in which
the freedmen are treated as “vagrants,” but the action of Congress will

145. The Civil Liberty Bill, N. AM. & U.S. GAZETTE, Feb. 5, 1866.
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convince the Southerners that colored people have recognized rights
which white men are “bound to respect.”146

The Boston Daily Journal does not suggest that somehow a category
of Jim Crow laws might be allowed whereas the Black Codes were not.
Instead, the paper posits a state of either slavery or freedom, and it
presumes that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 mandates total freedom as to
the specific civil rights the Act protected. Six days after that, the North
American and United States Gazette wrote on February 12, 1866:
The Civil Rights bill, to which we alluded on its passage by the Senate,
is properly connected with this Freedmen’s Bureau bill, and taken
together they will undoubtedly work great changes in the rebellious
States. They must render nugatory all efforts of the dominant rebel
influence to re-impose a pernicious system of caste upon the south and
to deprive the freedmen of their civil rights, or of the legal means of
defence.147

Again, the North American and United States Gazette did not
mention any category of social rights (an important omission that we will
discuss later in this Article), as to which there need not be equality
between the races, nor did it leave any room for allowance of Jim Crow
laws while overturning the Black Codes. Instead, the paper rejected the
South’s effort to re-impose a caste system—a system that was ultimately
sustained by the ban on racial intermarriage. The next day, the North
American and United States Gazette wrote:
Our duty is plain enough. We have it imperatively resting on us to
protect the freedmen, enforce their civil rights, see them allowed a fair
chance for rising in the scale of civilization, break up the legal
[unreadable] some of the States are trying to organize under the name
of militia to act as patrols and make men slaves again on the old
plantations, annul every rebel act of their executives or legislatures,
maintain freedom of speech and of the press, the liberty of migration,
white or black, and in fact, to destroy the reign of terror at the south,
upon which alone rests the whole power of the plantation oligarchy.
We cannot retreat from this line of policy without peril to the future of
the republic. If we act up to it steadily, unflinchingly, heeding no

146. Senator Sumner’s Speech – Debate on the Indemnification of Legal West Virginia –
Speech of Senator Clark of N.H. – The Passage of the Freedman’s Bureau Bill, BOS. DAILY J., Feb.
7, 1866.
147. The Practical Work of Reconstruction, N. AM. & U.S. GAZETTE, Feb. 12, 1866.
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resistance or clamor, or influence intended to arrest our progress, a
short time will break up the danger entirely.148

The paper clearly recognized that the South was trying to reinforce a
racial caste system to maintain the power of oligarchical plantation
interests.
The focus of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 on protecting all civil
rights was recognized in the Boston Daily Journal on February 23, 1866,
when it wrote: “There is no substantial disagreement among loyal men
respecting their civil rights. We all agree that they must have the civil
rights of any other class of citizens, the rights of person and property, to
sue and to be sued—in short equality before the laws.”149
The Philadelphia Inquirer said essentially the same thing on the
same day:
There is no substantial disagreement amongst loyal men respecting
their civil rights. We all agree that they must have the civil rights of any
other class of citizens. The right of person and property, to sue and be
sued, and to certify, in short, equality before the law; but whether they
shall also have the suffrage is a pending question.150

Equality of civil rights was taken to be a given—the only area of
disagreement was whether to give freed African Americans equal voting
rights as well. The New York Daily Tribune on February 28, 1866, went
further and hinted at some voting rights for African Americans:
We appeal, then, to the Statesmen of the South—and she still has
statesmen—to take ground boldly for a comprehensive and complete
reconciliation—one that shall include every class in every section—that
shall leave no discontents, no heart-burnings, no chances of future
insurrections and civil war. ALL RIGHTS FOR ALL—is our platform;
which does not imply that every man shall be a voter, but that color
shall not be a perpetual disqualification—that every rational youth or
man may confidently aspire and hope to become a member of the body
politic by faithfully endeavoring to qualify himself therefor.151

The New York Daily Tribune called for “all rights for all.” It would
be hard to read that as somehow allowing for Jim Crow while
disallowing the Black Codes.

148.
149.
150.
151.
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It is necessary to clarify here that the Black Codes, which were
nullified by the Civil Rights Act of 1866, did not all discriminate on their
face. Some of the Black Codes were stripped of textual references to race
precisely to elude accusations of racial discrimination and because word
of the impending passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 had spread.
Following an uproar in the North over the harsh and explicitly racist
Black Codes of Mississippi and South Carolina, subsequent southern
legislatures enacting Black Codes omitted explicit textual references to
race.152 But, as famed Reconstruction historian Eric Foner notes in a
quotation from Alabama planter and Democrat John W. DuBose, when
the Black Codes spoke of vagrants, “the vagrant contemplated was the
plantation negro.”153
As the winter of 1866 wore on, President Andrew Johnson startled
congressional Republicans by vetoing the first Freedman’s Bureau
Act.154 Johnson thought the Act was too socialistic, but he also opposed
giving African Americans equal civil rights with white Americans.155
Senate Republicans tried and failed to overturn the veto.156 For a while,
some congressional Republicans working on passing the Civil Rights Act
of 1866 hoped that President Johnson would sign that act because it gave
African Americans equal civil rights but it did not give them equal
political rights.157 The New York Daily Tribune thus wrote on March 1,
1866:
Whatever else may fail, we trust that Mr. Trumbull’s bill extending
legal protection to the civil rights of Blacks, which has already passed
the Senate, will soon pass the House also. That it is urgently needed,
the action of Southern legislatures abundantly proves. Say, if you can,

152. FONER, supra note 53, at 201.
153. FONER, supra note 53, at 201 (citing and quoting S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 6, 172–77, 180–83,
222–26, 209–10 (1866); JOHN W. DUBOSE, ALABAMA’S TRAGIC DECADE: TEN YEARS OF
ALABAMA, 1865–1874, at 55 (James K. Greer ed., 1940); JOHN T. O’BRIEN, FROM BONDAGE TO
CITIZENSHIP: THE RICHMOND BLACK COMMUNITY, 1865–1867, at 304 (1974); MICHAEL WAYNE,
THE RESHAPING OF PLANTATION SOCIETY: THE NATCHEZ DISTRICT 1860–80 46–47 (1983);
THEODORE BRANTNER WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OF THE SOUTH 96–100 (1965); William Cohen,
Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 1865–1940: A Preliminary Analysis, 42 J. S. HIST. 31, 35–
50 (1976)).
154. FONER, supra note 53, at 247.
155. See Andrew Johnson’s Veto of the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, Feb. 19, 1866,
reprinted in 1 VETO MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, WITH THE ACTION OF
CONGRESS THEREON 289 (Benjamin Perley Poore, comp. 1886); see also Andrew Johnson’s Veto of
the Civil Rights Act to the Senate of the United States, Mar. 27, 1866, id. at 297.
156. FONER, supra note 53, at 249.
157. FONER, supra note 53, at 250.
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that all the direct and positive testimony of White outrages on the
Freedmen is false—and there is more of it than can be cited in support
of any fact in history—yet the single fact that no single Southern
Legislature has yet recognized the right of Blacks to the civil rights
accorded to every White alien, suffices to prove the need of such
legislation by Congress as Mr. Trumbull’s bill provides. We believe no
single Southern State has yet enabled Blacks to sue and be sued, to give
testimony and rebut testimony, on equal terms with Whites. All that
they do, under the pressure of necessity, is meanly, grudgingly,
shabbily done. What can be more absurd than to provide that a Black
may testify in cases between Blacks and Whites, but not when the
parties are both White? If he would ever swear falsely, would he not be
likely to do so in a case between a White and a Black? And, if his oath
can be taken in cases where he will naturally have a bias, why not in
cases where he is likely to have none? . . .
Why is the distinction made but to insult and degrade the Blacks? The
Cincinnati Commercial has a letter from a correspondent traveling
through Mississippi, who states that the barbarous Vagrant law recently
passed by the Rebel State Legislature is rigidly enforced, and under its
provisions the freed slaves are rapidly being reenslaved. No negro is
allowed to buy, rent, or lease any real estate; all minors of any value are
taken from their parents and bound out to planters: and every freedman
who does not contract for a year’s labor is taken up as a vagrant. The
officers of the Freedmen’s Bureau are often not accessible, and the
freedmen are kept back, by the distance, from complaining. Finally, as
the writer estimates, it would take an army of 20,000 men to compel the
planters to do justice to the freedmen.
Mr. Trumbull’s bill takes right hold of this matter, and subjects the
oppressors to pains and penalties which they will seldom choose to
invoke. We pray that it be passed soon, even though it should cost the
Copperheads and impenitent Rebels more than they can well afford to
pay for the powder they will expend in celebrating the Veto.158

On March 9, 1866, the House of Representatives debated a suggestion to
amend the bill, striking the general provision concerning civil rights and
leaving the specifically enumerated list of rights in Section 1.159 The
general civil rights language, which was eliminated, provided “[t]hat
there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities among the

158. Civil Rights, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Mar. 1, 1866.
159. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1290–93 (1866).
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inhabitants of any State or Territory of the United States on account of
race, color, or previous condition of slavery.”160
On March 13, the House adopted the version of the bill that did not
include the general civil rights language.161 Alexander Bickel’s focus on
original intent characterizes this event as an important one in determining
the meaning of the bill.162 However, not only did the bill’s main
proponent in the House of Representatives disagree on whether the
deletion of the general language changed the meaning of the bill,163 the
common understanding of the bill seemed to remain the same.
Concurrent with and immediately after the revision, the pending Civil
Rights Act of 1866 was described as follows by the New York Herald.
Writing on April 13, 1866, the paper said:
This is the law. It sweeps away not only all the old slave codes and free
negro laws of the Southern States, but the legislation which they have
adopted in reference to their black population since the suppression of
the rebellion and their submission to the supreme authority of the
United States.164

A sister paper, the New York Tribune, said the next day on March 14,
1866:
It is of very great importance that some legislation should be perfected
for the protection of the freedmen. We believe this bill contains the
seeds of a reform sure to be widely beneficial. It is just, moderate, and
constitutional; and while other measures are delayed, there is the more
urgent need for the speedy enactment of this. Let us do something—let
Congress do something—to assure the country that its zeal for justice
and equal rights is not to issue in fruitless dissensions.165

The paper was clearly appealing in the wake of President Johnson’s
veto of the first Freedman’s Bureau Bill for some moderate legislation
protecting equal civil rights. The North American and United States
Gazette described the Civil Rights Bill on March 16, 1866, saying: “This
bill, against which these Democrats voted, merely guarantees to the
freedmen the right to hold property, to collect wages by suit, and to

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 474–75.
Id. at 1366–67.
BICKEL, supra note 21, at 25–26.
CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 1366.
N.Y. HERALD, Mar. 13, 1866.
N.Y. TRIB., Mar. 14, 1866.
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protect their liberty by legal proceedings.”166 The same day the Boston
Daily Journal said, “The Senate concurred to-day in the amendments of
the House to the bill for the protection of all persons in the United States
in their civil rights, and for furnishing the means of their vindication.”167
Supporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 described it as giving
African Americans equal civil rights with white Americans, thus
overturning the Black Codes and Chief Justice Roger Taney’s statements
in Dred Scott v. Sandford to the effect that free African Americans could
never be citizens or the white man’s equal. As the New York Herald said
on March 17, 1866:
In a word, this bill, in regard to his civil rights, places the black man
throughout the United States upon the same footing with the white
man, and furnishes ample facilities for the enforcement of the law
everywhere by the executive, judicial and military authorities of the
United States. This is a tremendous transformation of the old order of
things, when it was decreed from the Supreme Court by Chief Justice
Taney that the negro, bond or free, was not an American citizen, and
had “no rights which the white man was bound to respect.” But this
decision we find under the constitution as it was, when these civil
disabilities of the African race were accepted or tolerated by all
departments of the government as necessary to the protection of the
Southern institution of African slavery. With the abolition of this
institution, the foundation upon which all of these distinctions rested,
they too are all swept away. Under the constitution as it is slavery is
abolished and interdicted over all the States and Territories, and
Congress has “the power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.”
But does the power to enforce the freedom of the blacks involve the
power to enforce their equal civil rights as citizens over the legislation
of the several States? It seems to us that such is the scope of this
constitutional amendment. Take away slavery, and as there is no color
in the constitution, all men of every color stand upon the same level as
citizens of the United States. The enforcement of this amendment,
therefore, abolishing slavery, involves the power to enforce this
equality in civil rights. Upon this subject it follows that not only are all
the old slave codes and black laws of the South abolished, but that the
reconstructive legislation of the late rebel States, from Virginia to
Texas, embracing one system of laws for the whites, and another for

166. The Question of Civil Rights, N. AM. & U.S. GAZETTE, Mar. 16, 1866.
167. Passage of the Civil Rights and Deficiency Bills, BOS. DAILY J., Mar. 16, 1866.
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the blacks, must all go by the board. Does this interfere with the
reconstruction policy of President Johnson? We think not. On the
contrary, it relieves him of a vast amount of the troublesome work in
the protection of the civil rights of the freedmen.
This Civil Rights bill we regard, accordingly, as a practical, just and
beneficent measure, and one which the President will cheerfully
approve. It does not touch the question of negro suffrage, and it does
not provide for the encouragement of laziness among the Southern
blacks and white refugees by inviting them to laugh and grow fat upon
the public treasury.168

This New York Herald editorial emphasizes that while the Civil
Rights Bill did not give African Americans the right to vote, it did
“place[] the black man throughout the United States upon the same
footing with the white man . . . .”169 The editorial clearly realizes that the
Civil Rights Bill gave African Americans equal civil rights to white
Americans.170 While the editorial does not say the Bill will allow racial
intermarriage, it does not recognize a social sphere in which Jim Crow
laws might be constitutionally permissible while the Black Codes were
not.171
An editorial in a Boston paper two days later would have gone even
further and would have given African American men the right to vote.
Thus, the Boston Daily Journal wrote on March 19, 1866:
[T]he prevalent opinion here is that it [the Civil Rights bill] will be
signed and will become a portion of the law of the land. Black men at
the South will then “be entitled to the full and equal benefit of all laws
for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, and to none other.” The
question then arises, if these black men can receive civil rights from
Congress, should they not also receive from the same source the
political right to suffrage?172

The Baltimore Sun took note of the contents of the Civil Rights
Bill.173

168.
1866.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

The Civil Rights Bill—Its Probable Approval by the President, N.Y. HERALD, Mar. 17,
Id.
Id.
Id.
The Civil Rights Bill, BOS. DAILY J., Mar. 19, 1866.
The Baltimore Sun noted:
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The Senate sponsor of the Civil Rights Bill had been Senator Lyman
Trumbull of Illinois, a former friend and competitor of President
Abraham Lincoln.174 Trumbull was a staunch advocate of equal rights
for African Americans.175 It is thus interesting to see what the Illinois
newspapers said about the meaning and purpose of the Civil Rights Bill.
The Chicago Tribune, on March 28, 1866, described it as follows:
The bill itself is a simple enactment to carry into effect the
Constitutional Amendment abolishing slavery, as was justly
characterized by Senator Trumbull as the most important measure that
had been considered by Congress since the adoption of the
Amendment. The spirit of the bill is fully expressed in its title—a bill to
secure the civil rights of men, who, heretofore being slaves, had no
civil rights which anybody was bound to respect. It proposed to confer
no political rights. It gave to the freedman that which the laws of all
civilized nations give to every man—the right to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease sell, hold and convey real and personal property, and full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and
property. The machinery for the bill was operative only in States where
these natural and inalienable rights were denied by the rebellious
majority of the whites, as for instance in the State of Mississippi, one of
whose statutes provides that if any person of African descent residing
in that State travels from one county to another without having a pass
or certificate of his freedom, he is liable to be committed to jail and to
be dealt with as a person who is in the State without authority. Other
provisions of the state prohibit any negro or mulatto from having firearms, and one provision of the statute declares that for “exercising the
functions of a minister of the Gospel free negroes and mulattoes, on

The civil rights bill, which has passed both houses of Congress and now awaits the action
of the President, is intended to secure to all persons of whatever race or color, exclusive
of Indians not taxed, “the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, to be sued, be parties and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,” and
to make them subject to the same penalties, pains and punishments, and no others, any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation or custom to the contrary notwithstanding. It provides
that any person who shall cause any citizen to be deprived of either of the rights above
recited shall be punished . . . .
The Civil Rights Bill, BALT. SUN, Mar. 24, 1866.
174. 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 1848–1865, at 9–11 (Roy P. Basler
ed. 2008) (Letter to Jesse Olds Norton, Feb. 16, 1855); id. at 355 (Letter to Lyman Trumbull, Feb. 3,
1859).
175. Senator Trumbull’s Speech on the Veto, BOS. DAILY J., Apr. 4, 1866.
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conviction, may be punished by any number of lashes not exceeding
thirty-nine, on the bare back, and shall pay the costs.” Other provisions
of the statute of Mississippi prohibit a free negro or mulatto from
keeping a house of entertainment, and subject him to trial before two
justices of the peace and five slaveholders for violating the provisions
of this law. The statutes of South Carolina make it a highly penal
offense for any person, white or colored, to teach blacks to read. These
and similar laws violating the spirit of Republican institutes abound in
all the Southern States. Their purpose is to keep slavery alive until it
can be re-established by law. Against this whole slave machinery the
Civil Rights bill is battering ram. Without it, or something equally
effective, the Constitutional Amendment is a delusion—a mere
mouthful of spoken wind—a glittering generality as worthless to
enforce the great fist of the people, as was the Declaration of
Independence itself to give freedom to all men.176

This Chicago Tribune editorial clearly did not contemplate that a
category of Jim Crow laws would survive the Civil Rights Bill’s
enactment while the Black Codes would not.
On March 27, President Andrew Johnson, already embroiled in
disagreement with his own party regarding his recent veto of the first
Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, issued a veto message that rejected the specific
terms and underlying principle of the proposed Civil Rights Act of
1866.177 The two bills taken together had united the radical and moderate
wings of the Republican Party behind Senator Trumbull, who was widely
viewed as being a Republican moderate and leader in the Senate who had
sponsored both pieces of legislation.178 Support for the Freedman’s
Bureau Bill and the Civil Rights Bill had grown steadily as report after
report had arrived in Washington, D.C., from the southern states
describing pervasive persecution of freedmen, of loyal white citizens,
and of northerners then living in the South.179 In light of the emerging
conclusion that the southern states could not refrain from blatant
discrimination without federal intervention, Republicans felt secure that
President Johnson would sign both the first Freedmen’s Bureau Bill and
the Civil Rights Bill.180 Yet on February 19 of 1866, President Johnson
had vetoed the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, mischaracterizing the agency as

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

The Second Veto, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 1866.
FONER, supra note 53, at 250.
Id. at 246–47.
Id. at 246.
Id. at 247.
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a “permanent branch of the public administration” when it was meant to
be temporary, and making arguments that foreshadowed his veto of all
subsequent Republican Reconstruction legislation, including the Civil
Rights Bill.181
Johnson’s veto message regarding the Civil Rights Bill was stunning
in its harsh racism, and it permanently alienated Johnson from both the
moderate and radical wings of the Republican Party.182 Johnson’s veto
message crystallized the resolve of congressional Republicans to
override his veto, and it provoked outrage from both sides in the public
debate over the Bill.183 The Chicago Tribune, on Thursday, March 29,
1866, articulated the oft-made distinction between civil and political
rights, and expressed support for granting freedmen the former:
The President asks if they “possess the requisite qualifications to entitle
them to all the privileges and immunities of citizens.” This bill does not
confer on them the right of suffrage, but only protection to person and
property. What “qualifications” does the President think a man ought to
possess in order to be entitled to protection. What “qualifications” must
a black man have more than a white man needs to enable him to sue for
his wages, to own land, to hire a house, to labor for his family, to
defend his house, his wife and children? . . .
....
Finally the President leaves wholly out of view the fact that the bill has
no operation per se, except in so far as the Southern people give it
operation and effect, by attempting to pass different laws for the blacks
over those that govern the whites. . . . [I]t only begins to operate when
the Southern whites begin to oppress . . . and it ceases altogether when
oppression ceases. The author of the veto of such a bill will go down in
history side by side with Taney and John Tyler, if he does not rise to an
infamy still more conspicuous.184

181. See Andrew Johnson’s Veto of the Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill (Feb. 19, 1866), 1
VETO MESSAGES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, WITH THE ACTION OF CONGRESS
THEREON 289 (Benjamin Perley Poore, comp. 1886); see also President Andrew Johnson’s Veto of
the Civil Rights Act to the Senate of the United States (Mar. 27, 1866), available at
http://wps.prenhall.com/wps/media/objects/107/109768/ch16_a2_d1.pdf.
182. The Second Veto, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 28, 1866; President Andrew Johnson’s Veto of the
Civil Rights Act to the Senate of the United States (Mar. 27, 1866), available at
http://wps.prenhall.com/wps/media/objects/107/109768/ch16_a2_d1.pdf.
183. Senator Sherman and the President’s Veto, N.Y. HERALD, Mar. 31, 1866; How the
President’s Veto was Received, N.Y. TRIB., Mar. 31, 1866.
184. The Veto Message, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 29, 1866.
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The very same day, the Boston Daily Journal editorialized in favor
of the necessity of equality as to civil rights to secure the good of the
Union. The Boston Daily Journal wrote on March 29, 1866:
We deeply regret the appearance of [the veto]. The bill which it seeks
to suppress was framed in furtherance of an object of transcendent
importance, made necessary by the triumph of the national cause, and
dear to the hearts of the patriotic masses. That object is to secure the
equality of American citizenship, to realize for the first time the
fundamental doctrines of the Declaration of Independence and carry out
the avowed purposes of the Constitution. The loyal people are perfectly
convinced that in this way only can we end up the gigantic evils
illustrated by and inherited from the rebellion, and restore solid
harmony and prosperity to the regenerated Union. As the flag is one
and the country is one, the law must be one, reaching to every citizen
alike, conveying the same rights and securities, without regard to color
or former class and condition. When we get down to that broad and
solid foundation everything will [unreadable] well, and not before.
And yet when a measure of those beneficent aims is brought before the
President, instead of looking upon it favorably, and even, as might be
supposed, stretching his desire to approve the main features of the bill
to cover some objectionable details, he makes the details the main thing
and regards the whole bill as critically as if its purpose were to give
power to a corporation or to a class, instead of diffusing equality among
all. No great measure—certainly no measure adequate to the exigency
which this is designed to meet—could be criticized in this minute way
without finding many apparent objections, and it must be said that
several of those urged by the President are only apparent . . . .
Everything in the Southern States is now against the negro—the laws,
the customs, the habits, and the prejudices of the white and ruling class.
All the dice are loaded against the freedman, and he has a fair chance
nowhere, outside the protection of the Federal bayonets and the Federal
laws. This civil rights bill was designed to furnish him adequate and
permanent security, and we believe it does it with no injury and as little
inconvenience to the whites as is possible under the circumstances. We
are sorry that the President does not so regard it, and we hope it will be
repassed over his veto.185

Let us emphasize here that the Boston Daily Journal recognized that
“[a]s the flag is one and the country is one, the law must be one, reaching
to every citizen alike . . . without regard to color or former class and
185. The President’s Veto of the Civil Rights Bill, BOS. DAILY J., Mar. 29, 1866.
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condition.”186 There is no room here to read the Civil Rights Bill as if it
somehow allowed Jim Crow laws while disallowing the Black Codes.
The paper clearly calls for the complete abolition of all racial
classifications in lawmaking.
Public opinion supporting Andrew Johnson’s veto of the Civil Rights
Bill echoed his view that to legally equalize all citizens was to
disempower white citizens.187 As in Johnson’s veto message, the
editorials supporting the veto display blatant racism.188 They also
contain the constitutional arguments that the Fourteenth Amendment
ultimately repudiated.189 Again and again the opponents of the Civil
Rights Bill expressed fear about blacks voting, even though it was well
understood by everyone that the Bill conferred equal civil rights but not
equal political rights.190 In light of the commonly understood distinction
between civil and political rights, it is hard not to think that the
arguments the opponents of the Civil Rights Bill raised were not a red
herring. The framers and proponents of the Civil Rights Bill had, by this
time, said over and over again that the extension of equal civil rights to
blacks did not mean the extension of equal political rights. It was well
known that some proponents of the Civil Rights Bill hoped the vote
would be extended someday, and this desire was in fact articulated in
several of the editorials we cite here.191 But the argument that the Civil
Rights Bill secured any rights aside from full equality of civil rights was
contrary to both the text of the Bill and to all the statements of its
meaning in newspaper editorials.
Still, the critics of the Civil Rights Bill did raise the specter of
enfranchisement and of social equality as a means for drumming up
further opposition to the Bill. Thus, the New York Herald on March 29,
1866, wrote:

186. Id.
187. Endorsement of President Johnson, N.Y. HERALD, Mar. 29, 1866.
188. Andrew Johnson and Andrew Jackson—The Moral Power of Moral Courage. N.Y.
HERALD, Mar. 31, 1866; The Connecticut Election—The Real Issues Before the Voters, N.Y.
HERALD, Mar. 31, 1866; In Favor of President Johnson’s Policy, Against Negro Equality, Opposed
to $450,000 Additional School Tax, ST. LOUIS MO. REPUBLICAN, Mar. 29, 1866; Negro Superiority,
ST. LOUIS MO. REPUBLICAN, Apr. 8, 1866.
189. President Johnson’s Appeal to the People, N.Y. HERALD, Mar. 29, 1866.
190. Veto of the Civil Rights Bill, N. AM. & U.S. GAZETTE, Mar. 28, 1866. The Present
Attitude at the South, N. AM. & U.S. GAZETTE, Feb. 13, 1866; The Civil Rights Bill, BALT. SUN,
Mar. 24, 1866.
191. The Civil Rights Bill, BOS. DAILY J., Mar. 19, 1866. The New Veto. N.Y. TRIB., Mar. 28,
1866.
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The veto message shows irrefutably that the radicals design to make
this a mongrel government. It has unmasked them; they can no longer
maintain their hypocritical pretence of philanthropy. They hope and
expect to confer the right of suffrage upon the negroes; to elect negro
members of Congress from the Southern States; to make negroes
eligible for the highest offices in the land. The political equality for the
blacks thus conceded, how can their social equality be denied? They
must be permitted to propose marriage to our daughters; to sit at table
with white persons; to mingle familiarly in the best society.
More than this: we are asked to give the semi-civilized negro a
preference over the intelligent immigrant who lands upon our shores; to
punish a parent who refuses to allow a negro to marry his child; to cast
into prison any judge who decides the dicta of Congress
unconstitutional; . . . This is what the radicals demand, and all this they
have embodied in the Civil Rights bill, which ought to be called a bill
to deprive white men of all rights. . . . All who are in favor of
assassinating the republic in order to make the negro equal to the
whites will take sides with Congress.192

The New York Herald explicitly claims that the Civil Rights Bill
would lead to voting rights for African Americans as well as to racial
intermarriage and “a mongrel government.” As the paper says, “all this
they have embodied in the Civil Rights bill.”193 More credible opponents
of the Civil Rights Bill confined themselves to expressing concern over
its consequences for the relative role of the federal government and the
states.194

192. President Johnson’s Appeal to the People, N.Y. HERALD, Mar. 29, 1866. This paragraph
continues:
For the sake of three millions of negroes forty millions of white people have already been
involved in civil war; half of a great nation has been crippled and desolated; a heavy debt
has been placed upon the shoulders of our citizens; blood has been poured out like water;
precious lives have been ruthlessly sacrificed; but all this is not enough. Now, for the
sake of three millions of negroes, the white people of this country are asked to submit to
the abrogation of the constitution; to the exclusion of eleven States from the Union; to the
super-sedure of the State judiciary; to the petty tyranny of irresponsible spies, paid to
prefer complaints, whether justly or unjustly.
Id.
193. Id.
194. See The President’s Objections to the Civil Rights Bill, BALT. SUN, Apr. 2, 1886.
The more closely the provisions of the civil rights bill are considered, the more
powerfully will every candid mind be impressed with the importance of the service which
President Johnson has rendered by vetoing the measure. It is not so much the evils which
practically might flow from the administration of the law as the dangerous consequences
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Intermixed into the editorial comments of the opponents of the Bill
are also concerns about social equality that fit neither into the scheme of
civil nor political rights.195 These concerns seem clearly intended as
scare tactics designed to incite racially charged hatred. The particular
mention of interracial marriage as a possible result of the Civil Rights
Act was raised in Congress by members in the debates,196 by President
Johnson in his veto message,197 and in the public discourse.198
Legislators and popular commentators struggled to explain how the Bill
could guarantee liberty of contract to African Americans without also
condoning interracial marriage.199 This blind spot in the debate over the
Civil Rights Bill shows the pervasive nature of the racism alive at the
time, and the stunning magnitude of the social changes brought about by
the abolition of slavery. The idea that marriage is the outcome of a
contract had been long established by 1866. Blackstone’s Commentaries
had said as much authoritatively a century prior to Reconstruction.200
That the ability to enter into marriage contracts pertained to liberty of
contract, or to the security of property, could not be questioned. The
Civil Rights Act plainly on its face protected liberty of contract. Many of
the editorials we have presented here make this point abundantly clear.
That dissonance existed between the stated intent of the Bill with regard
to the equalization of marriage rights and the legal reality of the Bill’s

to public liberty from the admission of the general powers which the bill asserts, that
mark the President’s message and give it intrinsic value.
Id.
195. President Johnson’s Appeal to the People, N.Y. HERALD, Mar. 29, 1866.
196. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1121 (1866).
197. President Andrew Johnson’s Veto of the Civil Rights Act to the Senate of the United
States
(Mar.
27,
1866),
available
at
http://wps.prenhall.com/wps/media/objects/
107/109768/ch16_a2_d1.pdf.
198. The Veto of the Civil Rights Bill, ST. LOUIS MO DEMOCRAT, Apr. 3, 1866. President
Johnson’s Appeal to the People, N.Y. HERALD, Mar. 29, 1866.
199. Id.
200. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CHAPTER THE
FIFTEENTH:
OF
HUSBAND
AND
WIFE
421, available
at
http://avalon.law.yale.
edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk4ch15.asp (“Our law Considers Marriage in no other light than as a
Civil Contract”). In fact, Blackstone’s Commentaries were so well known, and held in such high
regard, that Senator Lyman Trumbull invoked them in January 1866 on the Senate floor, citing
directly from the text as he sought to authoritatively define “civil liberty” as
no other than natural liberty, so far restrained by human laws and no further, as is
necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the public . . . In this definition of
civil liberty it ought to be understood, or rather expressed, that the restraints introduced
by the law should be equal to all, or as much so as the nature of things will admit.
CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 474 (1866).
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text can be attributed to genuine misunderstanding or willful
misrepresentation for the purpose of securing its passage. Despite the
level of detail available on these debates both in the public sphere and in
the legislature, this is one distinction we may never be able to clarify.201
Ironically, the strongest arguments for the equality of all contract
rights, including rights to enter into marriage contracts, is perhaps best
articulated by the detractors of the Civil Rights Act.
The St. Louis Missouri Democrat on April 3, 1866, summarized
President Johnson’s reasons for vetoing the Civil Rights Bill. The paper
said:
What are the President’s objections? That the Southern Congressmen
have not been admitted! That the bill declares the freedman a citizen!
That it makes him, before the law, an equal to another citizen! That this
is an interference with the reserved rights of the States! That it
abrogates the State statutes that discriminate against him because he
has “a skin not colored like our own!” That the bill is, therefore,
unconstitutional, tends to an undue centralization of government
powers, and as a consequent subversion of Republican principles!
[Unreadable] the noblest sentiment that ever inspired a people tried in
the fires of a war between the demon of oppression and the angel of
justice—is far less admirable than Taney’s demonstration that “the
black man has no rights which the white man is bound to respect.” The
“intensely logical spirit of evil” has been even more successful in its
sophistries, but rarely more false to humanity than in this instance.202

On April 6, 1866, the Senate passed the Civil Rights Act over the
President’s veto.203 The House followed three days later.204 The passage
of the act marked the first time Congress had enacted major legislation
over a presidential veto in seventy-seven prior years of the history of the
United States.205 The passage of the Civil Rights Act was lauded by
some and bemoaned by others, but regardless of the rhetoric attached, the
common understanding of the bill was that it stripped away any
differences between white and African American citizens with regard to
201. Though Senator Lyman Trumbull addressed the implications of the bill on interracial
marriage explicitly in Congress, he did not do so in his response to President Johnson’s veto
message. This may be of note, given that Johnson raised a number of specific objections to the civil
rights bill, each of which was addressed and refuted by Trumbull in his response, with the exception
of the question of interracial marriage.
202. The Veto of the Civil Rights Bill, ST. LOUIS MO. DEMOCRAT, Apr. 3, 1866.
203. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1789 (1866).
204. Id. at 1865.
205. FONER, supra note 53, at 250–51.

1453

1.CALABRESI.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/8/2013 2:56 PM

2012

the civil rights associated with the protection of contract, person, and
property.
The Act’s passage was celebrated in the Chicago Tribune, Senator
Trumbull’s hometown newspaper, which said on Saturday, April 7: “The
action of the Senate yesterday is a great victory. It will tell powerfully on
the country, on the coming elections, and even the semi-barbarians
whose treatment of colored people renders a Civil Rights Bill
necessary.”206 And on Sunday, April 8, the Chicago Tribune further
elaborated:
The Southern Legislature can now enact that a colored man shall not
own real or personal property, shall not work at any mechanical trade,
shall not learn to read, shall not have a house, shall not leave his
employer’s premises without a pass, shall be subject to corporal
punishment at the hands of his ‘master’ or any other of those
oppressive and mischievous laws by which the Southern Legislatures
have already attempted to re-enslave the three millions which Abraham
Lincoln and our Union armies made free. Every member of a
Legislature who votes for a law, and every judge or officer who
enforces one which operates any differently on a black man than it does
upon a white, is liable to a fine of one thousand dollars and a term of
imprisonment. Colored men born in this country are henceforth citizens
of the United States and their respective states “and are to be so
regarded.
The achievement of this great triumph sent a thrill of satisfaction and
relief throughout the hearts of the entire loyal people. We breathed
freer, on learning that at last the law-making power, the supreme
legislature of the country has asserted its own rights, and vindicated the
cause of liberty, and that an effectual check is at least imposed on the
President, who has all the arbitrary disposition of a Napoleon without
his capacity to respond to the progressive instincts of the people.207

The Tribune clearly thought the Civil Rights Act of 1866 had
secured full equality of all civil rights. On the dissenting side, the St.
Louis Missouri Republican on April 8, 1866, commemorated the passage
of the Act by writing:
Negro Superiority: The charge of the Radical revolutionists seek to
bring about “negro equality” is faulty in not going far enough. The fact
is, that they seek to give the negro a preference over the white man.

206. Passage of the Civil Rights Bill, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 7, 1866.
207. CHI. TRIB., Apr. 8, 1866.
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They talk very plausibly about making all men “equal before the law,”
but are at the same time contriving measures to make them unequal.
Such is the character of the measures embodied in the bills, whose
passage President Johnson has so nobly resisted. The same spirit is
betrayed by some of those who are intrusted with the management of
the freedmen.208
. . . The negro, more favored, has . . . services for nothing. Is this that
equality before the law, which these Radicals profess to desire so
earnestly? . . . The truth is, the Radical politicians who now wield the
power of Congress with such reckless and demoniac energy, mean to
prefer the blacks over the great mass of whites.209

The New York Herald asked sarcastically on April 9, 1866, after the
Senate passage of the Civil Rights Act over President Johnson’s veto:
And what next? Having secured their great object of placing all races
and colors in all the States and Territories of the Union as citizens on a
footing of equality in regard to their civil rights, and having placed the
Southern blacks under the protection of the President, the Freedmen’s
Bureau, and the judicial and military authorities of the United States,
etc., may we not conclude that the radicals will be prepared to consider
the claims of the excluded Southern States to a hearing in Congress?210

Note that the Herald concedes that the Civil Rights Act led to
complete equality between the races as to civil rights. From the St. Louis
Missouri Democrat, on Tuesday, April 10, 1866:
What They Think of the Veto in Canada.
Here is what the Toronto Globe thinks of the President’s last veto:
It is difficult to realize that this man, who has the hardihood to
make these objections to the civil rights bill, is the same man who,
during the war, was a violent advocate of abolition—who, after the
war was over, promised to be the special protector of the blacks,

208. The editorial adds:
This is shown in a recent order from the Freedmen’s Bureau, instructing all assistant
commissioners to act as claim agents for colored soldiers and sailers [sic], in collecting
their claims against the United States without charge, excepting for revenue stamps,
salaries, fees, etc. Here, it is shown, the Government is made to step on and act as agent
for black soldiers and sailers [sic], thus saving black men the expense of employing an
agent, while no such favor is extended to white soldiers and sailors.
209. ST. LOUIS MO. REPUBLICAN, Apr. 8, 1866.
210. The Civil Rights Bill––Probable Action of the House To-Day, N.Y. HERALD , Apr.
1866.

9,
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and talked of taking care that loyal men, white and black, should
govern the South; and declared that the rebels should be punished,
and that their treason should be made odious. What a change have
a few months wrought in his Excellency! In the worst days of
slavery its avowed advocates hardly put their hostility to justice
between race and race in bolder or more shameless language. The
civil rights bill deprives the States of the power to make civil
distinctions between the two races—it deprives them of the right to
have one set of laws for the blacks and another for the whites—of
having one set of pains and penalties for white offenders and
another for black—and, therefore, it is vetoed! These are the very
reasons which ought to induce any honest man—any friend of
justice—to sanction the measure.
These are words of truth and soberness, not prompted by any of the
partisan feeling which may be supposed to animate the journals of this
country. It will be noticed, says the Chicago Republican, that they don’t
differ much from what Republicans think and say on this side of the
border.211

The St. Louis Missouri Democrat continues saying:
The Veto Vetoed.
The Bill is not, as misrepresented, a bill admitting the freedmen to the
ballot-box, or advancing him a step towards social equality with the
white man, but simply to secure practically to him the rights which the
common law from time immemorial has conceded to the humblest, yet
which slavery had swept away, and which the ex-slaveholders were not
ready to restore.212

The paper concludes by saying:
To Honest Conservatives.
When the Constitution was adopted there were “free persons” and
“persons held to labor or service”—freemen and slaves. The former,
both black and white participated in adopting the Constitution. People
of color voted in a majority of the States, and being citizens of those
States were thereby, by the terms of the National Constitution, invested
with the privileges and immunities of citizens of the other States also.
But slavery assailed the citizenship of the free colored man and sought
to place him politically on the plane of the slave. Slavery now being

211. What They Think of the Veto in Canada, ST. LOUIS MO. DEMOCRAT, Apr. 10, 1866.
212. The Veto Vetoed, ST. LOUIS MO. DEMOCRAT, Apr. 10, 1866.
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legally dead, the National Constitution recognizes only free persons,
and with equal sacredness guarantees the rights of them all. In the light
of the Constitution, the rights of the four millions of freedmen are as
full and perfect, as holy and inviolable as are the rights of any other
four millions of free persons within the United States.213

The editorials we have recounted above214 do not, for the most part,
specifically address the issue of the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of

213. To Honest Conservatives, ST. LOUIS MO. DEMOCRAT, Apr. 10, 1866. The editorial adds:
Slavery was recognized by the Constitution, but freedmen as distinguished from freemen
or “free persons” are not so recognized. The freedmen are, under the National flag and
Constitution, absolutely free, part and parcel of “the people of the United States,” and
have as valid a claim to the benefit of a Republican form of government as their white
fellow citizens. If the Southern States will concede this claim the controversy will then
end; but if not, the duty of enforcing the claim is by the Constitution in the most explicit
terms devolved upon the General Government.
Id.
214. One final editorial that bears mention is from the Baltimore Sun, on April 24, 1866:
In the reflections which we have heretofore submitted to the public in connection
with the civil rights bill, we stated that our objections to the measure rested not upon the
kind of protection which it affords to negroes for persons or property, but because
legislation of that character on the part of Congress was beyond the scope of its
constitutional powers, and an invasion of the plain line of separation between State and
federal authority. Regarding the restraints of the constitution as the efficient means for
preserving our institutions, we estimated any overthrow of constitutional barriers not by
its immediate practical consequence, but by the unbridled license of arbitrary power,
which thenceforth would have no check but its own caprice. Stating in this manner the
magnitude of the evil we contemplated, we further argued that there was no justification
or adequate [unreadable] in the exigency of circumstances for such usurpation of power
by Congress—for that the people whom this law was designed to protect had, in most
cases already the benefit of its provisions; that under the laws of the several States they
are already secure in their persons and property, and that it is neither the purpose nor the
interest of the white race to disturb them in the just fruition of the returns of honest
industry. Our further argument was that the mutual wants and dependences of capital and
labor, to say nothing of higher moral considerations, were rapidly adjusting the two races
to the altered circumstances which the overthrow of slavery has occasioned, and that
without the aid of legislation an intelligent regard for their mutual interest is solving
much more rapidly, healthfully and happily the social problems of the times than
legislation by the federal government possibly can. That we have not misapprehended or
overstated the sentiment of the people of Maryland in the views we have expressed, the
resolutions adopted by the mass meeting of the citizens of Somerset county on the 10th
may be [unreadable] as one proof, wherein it is declared that since the amendment of the
Federal constitution abolishing slavery it is our duty to favor all legislation necessary to
protect the enjoyment of his freedom and personal rights, but protesting against all
attempts to make him the special object of national favoritism, etc.
But, a reference to the actual legislation of the State will be accepted as perhaps
more convincing and more substantial proof of what The Sun said, and may serve the
further purpose of correcting some false impressions in regard to our laws, which,
through accident, design, or ignorance, may have found [unreadable] in some minds.
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1866 for interracial marriages. These editorials do, however, all make
clear that it was widely if not universally understood that the Act
guaranteed equality with respect to civil rights albeit not with respect to
political rights. At a bare minimum, most people reading these editorials
must have thought that once the bill became a law it would give to
African Americans the same common law rights as were enjoyed by
white citizens. Since a white citizen had a common law right to marry a
white citizen, an African American citizen must have obtained the
“same” right under the Civil Rights Act of 1866. To the extent that
people did not expect this, they were willfully misleading themselves by
failing to consider the plain meaning of the text that had become law.
We agree with Yale Law Professor Jack Balkin that it is not the
original expected applications of a legal text that bind us, but it is instead
the words that are enacted into law.215 It is thus irrelevant whether
people in 1866 expected the Civil Rights Act to confer a right to racial
intermarriage. What matters instead is what the Act said given the
original public meaning of the words used at the time it was enacted into
law. The editorials we have surveyed offer no hope to those who would
claim that the Act somehow banned the Black Codes while allowing for

While the condition of servitude existed in Maryland, it was considered essential for the
security of the institution that the free negro population should be subjected to many
disabilities, and that the number of that class should be restricted as far as possible.
Hence the enactments which prohibited free negroes from coming into the State, and
prohibited those who had left the State from returning under severe penalties; hence the
stringent provisions in regard to the arrest of the vagrants, and the regulations in respect
to their violations of contracts for hiring, and many other restrictions of the same class,
and designed to carry out the same general1 policy. All of these disabling laws have,
without exception, been repealed at the very first session of the Legislature after the
adoption of the present constitution by which slavery in Maryland was . . .
extinguished. . . .
But the legislation of the State has not stopped with the removal of the disabilities
which attached to the enjoyment of liberty and property by the Negro. The law of
[unreadable] March, 1865, chapter [unreadable], section 119, provides for the
establishment of public schools for the instruction of the colored people of the State, by
setting apart the entire school tax levied upon the colored people of the State for that
purpose, to be under the control of the educational board of the State, as is the school
system for whites. . . .
....
. . . By a comparison of these laws with the provisions of the civil rights bill, it will be
further discovered that there is no likelihood of the aid of that beneficent piece of
legislation being invoked amongst us.
The Laws of Maryland and the Civil Rights Bill, BALT. SUN, Apr. 24, 1866.
215. Steven G. Calabresi & Livia Fine, Two Cheers for Professor Balkin’s Originalism, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 663 (2009).
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a later generation of Jim Crow laws. The language of the Civil Rights
Act in conferring equal rights of contract on persons of every race and
color to make the same contracts white people could make is
unequivocal. We think the editorials we have surveyed lead to the same
conclusion as did the dictionaries that we surveyed. The Civil Rights Act
of 1866 gave African Americans the same right to enter into marriage
contracts with white citizens as was enjoyed by white citizens. Loving v.
Virginia is thus correct as a matter of the original meaning of the Civil
Rights Act and therefore of the Fourteenth Amendment as well.
V. THE CASE LAW ON RACIAL INTERMARRIAGE IN THE 1870S AND
LATER
Prior to the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, there had been
a very long history in the United States of legal bans on racial
intermarriage.216 As Cyrus E. Phillips IV explains:
Prohibitions against miscegenation date back to the earliest colonial
times, and the first record of sanctions imposed for this act in the
Virginia colony appears in Hening’s extract from the judicial
proceedings of the Governor and Council of Virginia:
September 17th, 1630. Hugh Davis to be soundly whipped, before
an assembly of negroes and others for abusing himself to the
dishonor of God and shame of Christians, by defiling his body in
lying with a negro; which fault he is to acknowledge next Sabbath
day.
That prohibitions against miscegenation have been widespread in the
United States can be seen in the fact that they have appeared in the
statutes of some forty states. Of these forty, twenty-three [had repealed
their statutes by the time of the decision in Loving v. Virginia but
seventeen states had not done so.]217

It is sad to say, but by 1866 laws against racial intermarriage were
deeply rooted in American history and tradition.
The question, which arose after the adoption of the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, was whether the Act barred state laws prohibiting
miscegenation. Our analysis here has benefitted from a blog post by

216. PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE MAKING
(2009).
217. Cyrus E. Phillips IV, Miscegenation: The Courts and the Constitution, 8 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 133, 133 (1966) (citation omitted).
OF RACE IN AMERICA

1459

1.CALABRESI.FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2/8/2013 2:56 PM

2012

David Koppel on The Volokh Conspiracy.218 We discovered this post
only after writing the analysis in this Article up to this page, and Kopel’s
post, which relies on a book by Peggy Pascoe called What Comes
Naturally: Miscegenation Law and the Making of Race in America,219 is
especially helpful to our argument in this essay. Kopel notes that the first
state Supreme Court decision to address the question of whether the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 banned state anti-miscegenation laws came in the
Alabama Supreme Court’s decision in 1872 in Burns v. State220.
Strikingly, the Alabama Supreme Court said in 1872 that “the state’s
1866 constitutional ban on miscegenation violated the ‘cardinal
principle’ of the Civil Rights Act and of the Equal Protection clause.”221
The Alabama constitutional provision in question was added to the
state constitution in 1866 when the Alabama state legislature first
reconstituted itself after the end of the Civil War and was dominated by
ex-Confederate forces.222 Other southern states passed similar antimiscegenation laws at the same time as the adoption of the Black
Codes.223 In 1867, a new Reconstruction government held a new election
in Alabama in which large numbers of freed African Americans were
eligible to vote for the first time.224 This expanded electorate produced a
three judge white Republican dominated state supreme court. It was that
new state supreme court which held in 1872 that the 1866 antimiscegenation law violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
Fourteenth Amendment.225
The 1872 Alabama Supreme Court adopted the reasoning we set
forth in Part III of this Article as to why the 1866 anti-miscegenation law
violated the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment.
The unanimous state supreme court in Burns said:

218. David Kopel, The Original Meaning of the 14th Amendment Regarding Interracial
Marriage, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, (Dec. 5, 2011, 5:39 PM), http://volokh.com/2011 /12/05/theoriginal-meaning-of-the-14th-amendment-regarding-interracial-marriage; see also Michael Ramsey,
THE ORIGINALISM BLOG (Dec. 6, 2011, 07:00 AM), http://originalism blog.typepad.com/theoriginalism-blog/2011/12/originalism-in-the-blogsmichael-ramsey-1.html (reposting David Kopel’s
post).
219. PASCOE, supra note 216.
220. 48 Ala. 195 (1872).
221. Kopel, supra note 218.
222. PASCOE, supra note 216, at 29–30, 57–58.
223. Id. at 28–30.
224. FONER, supra note 53, at 314.
225. PASCOE, supra note 216, at 58.
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Marriage is a civil contract, and in that character alone is dealt with by
the municipal law. The same right to make a contract as is enjoyed by
white citizens, means the right to make any contract which a white
citizen may make. The law intended to destroy the distinctions of race
and color in respect to the rights secured by it. It did not aim to create
merely an equality of the races in reference to each other. If so, laws
prohibiting the races from suing each other, giving evidence for or
against, or dealing with one another, would be permissible. The very
excess to which such a construction would lead is conclusive against
it.226

The Burns court adds:
One of the rights conferred by citizenship, therefore, is that of suing
any other citizen. The civil rights bill now confers this right upon the
negro in express terms, as also the right to make and enforce contracts,
amongst which is that of marriage with any citizen capable of entering
into that relation.227

The Burns opinion obviously reads the text of the Civil Rights Act
and of the Fourteenth Amendment, which constitutionalizes it, in exactly
the same way we do in Part III of this Article. The right to marry is the
right to make a certain kind of contract, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866
gives African Americans “the right to make any contract which a white
citizen may make.”228 Since a white citizen could make a contract to
marry a white citizen, it follows inexorably that citizens of any race or
color could also make such a contract.
Kopel goes on to note in his blog post that the Texas Supreme Court
unanimously ruled in 1872 in Bonds v. Foster, an inheritance case, that
“the law prohibiting such a [common law] marriage [between a white
and a black] had been abrogated by the 14th Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.”229 The Texas Supreme Court thus
reached the same conclusion, in 1872, as had the Alabama Supreme
Court. Kopel cites Pascoe’s book for the striking proposition that “in the
years after the Civil War, eleven states repealed their bans on interracial
marriage.”230 This suggests that condemnation of interracial marriage

226.
227.
228.
229.
note 218.
230.

Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195, 197 (1872), overruled by Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877).
Id. at 198.
Id. at 197.
Bonds v. Foster, 36 Tex. 68, 69–70 (1871) (inheritance case), quoted in Kopel, supra
Kopel, supra note 218.
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was perhaps not as widespread during Reconstruction as Professor
Alexander Bickel’s analysis, discussed in Part II of this Article above,
might otherwise have suggested.
This fact and the two southern supreme court opinions in Alabama
and Texas protecting a right to interracial marriage are especially striking
because the year before those two decisions were handed down, the
Indiana Supreme Court sitting in a northern state reached the exact
opposite conclusion on the constitutionality of bans on interracial
marriage in a case called State v. Gibson.231 The Indiana Supreme Court
concluded in Gibson in 1871 that marriage was more than a contractual
relationship because it led to a special kind of social and civil status or
institution. As the Gibson court said, “The right, in the states, to regulate
and control, to guard, protect, and preserve this God-given, civilizing,
and Christianizing institution is of inestimable importance, and cannot be
surrendered.”232 For that reason, it concluded that the Civil Rights Act of
1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to anti-miscegenation
laws.233 As Kopel points out, this holding was especially influential
because the Indiana Supreme Court was a northern state supreme court, a
fact which made Gibson “the essential citation.”234
The Burns decision was eventually overruled by the Alabama
Supreme Court in 1877, after the end of Reconstruction, in Green v.
State.235 The groundwork for this decision was laid in 1874 when the
Democrats regained their majority control of the Alabama state
legislature and the state supreme court. The new anti-Reconstruction
supreme-court majority in Green asked:
Is marriage . . . nothing more than a civil contract? Is it, “in that
character alone,” dealt with by the municipal law?
Doubtless, it is by a contract—that is, by the agreement of the
parties—that they enter into the state of marriage. But, as was said by
the Supreme Court of Delaware, it is a contract “of a peculiar character
and subject to peculiar principles. It may be entered into by persons
who are not capable of forming any other lawful contract; it can be
violated and annulled by law, which no other contract can be; and its
rights and obligations are derived rather from the law relating to it, than

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
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from the contract itself.” According to Judge Story: “Marriage is not
treated as a mere contract between the parties, subject as to its
continuance, dissolution and effects, to their mere pleasure and
intentions. But it is treated as a civil institution, the most interesting and
important in its nature, of any in society.”236

The Green court thus rejected the argument that marriage was
covered by the liberty of contract that was protected against racial
discrimination by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court concluded by saying that “[t]he amendments to
the Constitution were evidently designed to secure to citizens, without
distinction of race, rights of a civil or political kind only—not such as are
merely social, much less those of a purely domestic nature. The
regulation of these belongs to the States.”237
As Kopel notes, the Texas Intermediate Court of Appeals reached the
same conclusion in 1877 in Frasher v. State.238 The court in that case
held:
Marriage is not a contract protected by the Constitution of the United
States, or within the meaning of the Civil Rights Bill. Marriage is more
than a contract within the meaning of the act. It is a civil status, left
solely by the Federal Constitution and the laws to the discretion of the
states, under their general power to regulate their domestic affairs.239

Kopel goes on to say perceptively:
The regressive Frasher decision is one more data point in support of
the observation in Henry Sumner Maine’s great 1861 book Ancient
Law: “we may say that the movement of the progressive societies has
hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.” Maine’s book
elaborates in great detail why marriage law fits this paradigm.240

By the time the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue of the
constitutionality of a state law that penalized interracial marriage,
Reconstruction was clearly at an end. In Pace v. Alabama, Justice

236. Id. at 193 (citation omitted) (quoting Townsend v. Griffin, 4 Del. 440, 442 (1846)). For
another contemporaneous account articulating this reasoning, see J OSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND
REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND
JUDGMENTS § 200, at 168 (1834).
237. Green, 58 Ala. at 196.
238. Kopel, supra note 218 (noting Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 263 (1877).
239. Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 263, 276 (1877) (emphasis omitted).
240. Kopel, supra note 218.
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Stephen Field upheld Alabama’s anti-miscegenation law for a unanimous
court.241 The case involved Tony Pace, an African American man, who
was living with Mary Cox, a white woman.242 They were prosecuted in
1881 for living together in an extra-marital sexual relationship contrary
to a law that penalized interracial, extra-marital relationships more
harshly than similar relationships between two white people or two black
people.243 Under the 1866 Alabama State Constitution, as reinterpreted
in Green v. State, it would have been illegal for Pace and Cox to marry.
Pace and Cox were convicted and sentenced in 1882 to two years in jail,
and they appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court challenging the
constitutionality of the 1866 ban on interracial marriage and
fornication.244 The court upheld the law saying:
The evil tendency of the crime of . . . adultery or fornication is greater
when it is committed between persons of the two races . . . . Its result
may be the amalgamation of the two races, producing a mongrel
population and a degraded civilization, the prevention of which is
dictated by a sound public policy affecting the highest interests of
society and government.245

Pace appealed his conviction to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
decided the case during the same year in which it botched The Civil
Rights Cases.246
Pace argued that Alabama discriminated on the basis of race when it
punished interracial fornication and adultery more harshly than the same
acts when committed between two white people or two black people.247
Justice Field’s opinion began by conceding that the Civil Rights Act
forbade any discrimination in civil rights on the basis of race. 248 Justice
Field said, however, that
[t]he defect in the argument of counsel consists in his assumption that
any discrimination is made by the laws of Alabama . . . . The two

241. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883), overruled in part by McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 188 (1964).
242. Id. at 584.
243. Id. at 583–84.
244. Id. at 584.
245. Pace v. State, 69 Ala. 231, 232 (1881).
246. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
247. Pace, 106 U.S. at 584.

248. Id.
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sections of the code cited are entirely consistent. The one prescribes,
generally, a punishment for an offence committed between persons of
different sexes; the other prescribes a punishment for an offence which
can only be committed where the two sexes are of different races.
There is in neither section any discrimination against either race. Sect.
4184 equally includes the offence when the persons of the two sexes
are both white and when they are both black. Sect. 4189 applies the
same punishment to both offenders, the white and the black. Indeed, the
offence against which this latter section is aimed cannot be committed
without involving the persons of both races in the same punishment.
Whatever discrimination is made in the punishment prescribed in the
two sections is directed against the offence designated and not against
the person of any particular color or race. The punishment of each
offending person, whether white or black, is the same.249

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Pace v. Alabama was joined even
by Justice John Marshall Harlan, who dissented in The Civil Rights
Cases250 and later in Plessy v. Ferguson.251 It is ironic, to say the least,
that the case came out of Alabama—the very same state whose state
supreme court in 1872 had said that bans on racial intermarriage violated
the “cardinal principle” of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and of the
Fourteenth Amendment.252 Justice Field’s analysis was perfunctory,
unpersuasive, and failed even to cite or respond to the Alabama and
Texas State Supreme Court rulings in 1872, which had reached the
opposite conclusion.253 It was a thoroughly disgraceful performance.
As David Kopel points out, the acceptance of the constitutionality of
bans on racial intermarriage and sexual relationships laid the critical
groundwork for the whole edifice of Jim Crow era segregation. Once it
became permissible to outlaw racial intermarriage, why would it be
impermissible to deny interracial seating on railroad trains? As Kopel
says:
By the time that Plessy v. Ferguson was decided in 1896, the Supreme
Court majority, which was willfully oblivious to contemporary social
reality (e.g., if blacks consider a segregation mandate to be a “badge of
249. Id. at 585.
250. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
251. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
252. Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195, 198 (1872); PASCOE, supra note 216, at 58 (“[T]he Alabama
Supreme Court declared the Alabama miscegenation law unconstitutional on the ground that it was
in direct opposition to the ‘cardinal principle’ of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantee of equal protection.”).
253. Burns, 48 Ala. at 195; Bonds v. Foster, 36 Tex. 68 (1871) (inheritance case).
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inferiority,” that is “solely because the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it”), was also lazily ignorant of legal history: “Laws
forbidding the intermarriage of the two races may be said in a technical
sense to interfere with the freedom of contact, [sic] and yet have been
universally recognized as within the police power of the state.” The
sole citation for this allegedly “universal” recognition was [the Indiana
State Supreme Court’s 1871 decision in] State v. Gibson. The Court
was right that as of 1895, miscegenation laws were constitutionally
safe, but the Court seemed quite unaware that during the first years
when the 14th Amendment and the Civil Rights Act were the law of the
land, the issue was in dispute.254

Pace v. Alabama suggested to the majority in Plessy that there was a
whole sphere of so-called social rights, as to which race discrimination
was allowed, which sphere was separate and apart from the civil rights
protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and by the Fourteenth
Amendment and from the political rights of African American men
protected by the Fifteenth Amendment. The fact that the great
Reconstruction texts make no mention of these supposed social rights
was simply overlooked and was swept under the rug.
The majorities in Pace v. Alabama and in Plessy v. Ferguson never
asked themselves whether it was at all plausible that a constitution which
guaranteed African American men the political right to vote could
somehow sanction depriving American citizens of their civil right to
marry anyone they so chose without regard to race. The Reconstruction
framers made it clear over and over again that the political right to vote
was a right that was at the apex of the pyramid of rights while civil
rights, like the right to marry, were at the pyramid’s base.255 Under the
reasoning of the Reconstruction Congress, it is implausible that African
American men might be given the political right to vote but might be
denied the civil right to marry anyone of whatever race they chose.256 If
someone can be trusted to vote for President, Senator, or Governor,
surely that person can make a contract to sit in the same railway car as
white people or to marry a white person.
The post-Reconstruction cases from 1871 to 1896 are important
because they show the validity of the semantic-meaning arguments we
make in Part III, after consulting Reconstruction dictionaries, and in Part

254. Kopel, supra note 218 (citations omitted).
255. Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 47–48 (2011).
256. Id.
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IV, after consulting Reconstruction editorials. Real state supreme court
justices in Alabama and in Texas in 1872 read the text of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment and came to the exact same
conclusions as to its implications for racial intermarriage as we have
argued for in Parts III and IV above. The hard, plain-meaning textualist
reading we give to the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was the very same
reading given to that Act by two pro-Reconstruction state supreme
courts. Were the justices on those courts biased toward Reconstruction?
Maybe to some degree they were, as were arguably the congresses that
produced the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments. Conversely, the Alabama Supreme Court justices who
took away the right to racial intermarriage in 1877 were undoubtedly
biased against Reconstruction, and even at the height of Reconstruction,
there was blatant racism in the South and throughout the country.
The point here is that our hard, plain-meaning textual reading of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 as protecting a right to racial intermarriage was
quite plausible to legal interpreters at the time of Reconstruction. We
have not conjured up some bizarre law professor’s reading of the legal
texts that went unnoticed at the time. To the contrary, our view was
initially the law in Alabama and Texas after 1872.
The U.S. Supreme Court eventually overruled Pace v. Alabama and
held anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia.257
This Article has attempted to show that, notwithstanding statements in
the legislative history, the original public meaning of the text of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and of the Fourteenth Amendment strongly supports
the outcome in Loving. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court in Loving, as
in Brown v. Board of Education, remained spooked by a legislative
history that should have been irrelevant to its decision. The Court
expressed its queasiness in the following paragraph:
The State argues that statements in the Thirty-ninth Congress about the
time of the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment indicate that the
Framers did not intend the Amendment to make unconstitutional state
miscegenation laws. Many of the statements alluded to by the State
concern the debates over the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, which President
Johnson vetoed, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, enacted
over his veto. While these statements have some relevance to the
intention of Congress in submitting the Fourteenth Amendment, it must
be understood that they pertained to the passage of specific statutes and

257. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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not to the broader, organic purpose of a constitutional amendment. As
for the various statements directly concerning the Fourteenth
Amendment, we have said in connection with a related problem, that
although these historical sources “cast some light” they are not
sufficient to resolve the problem; “[a]t best, they are inconclusive. The
most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly
intended them to remove all legal distinctions among ‘all persons born
or naturalized in the United States.’ Their opponents, just as certainly,
were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments
and wished them to have the most limited effect.”258

The opinion in Loving is spooked quite unnecessarily by the
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and of the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the same time, the Supreme Court seemed incapable of
making a hard, plain-meaning textual argument, even though all the
material for such an argument was right before them.
Once one applies the original public-meaning textualism of Justices
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas to this problem, all difficulties
disappear. The statutes that banned racial intermarriage and that forbade
African Americans from sitting in the same railway cars as white
Americans did not give “the same right . . . to citizens of every race and
color . . . to make or enforce contracts . . . as was enjoyed by white
citizens.”259 The Alabama Supreme Court figured this all out back in
1872 in Burns v. State when it said that under the Civil Rights Act of
1866 an African American could make any contract that a white
American could make.
There is the argument of Green v. State that marriage contracts are
unique in that they create a legal status, but this argument overlooks the
fact that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 on its face applies to all contracts.
Surely marriage is at least in part a matter of contract and is therefore
within the protection of the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Even if it were not,
marriage is clearly a Privilege or Immunity under the Fourteenth

258. Id. at 9 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954)); see also id. at 10
(“We have rejected the proposition that the debates in the Thirty-ninth Congress or in the state
legislatures which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment supported the theory advanced by the State,
that the requirement of equal protection of the laws is satisfied by penal laws defining offenses based
on racial classifications so long as white and Negro participants in the offense were similarly
punished.” (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964))); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303, 310 (1879).
259. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1981 (2012)).
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Amendment,260 which cannot be abridged on the basis of race, just as
marriage is clearly a Privilege and Immunity under Article IV as to
which states may not discriminate with respect to out-of-staters.261
The bottom line is that it is not the original, public-meaning Justices
on the U.S. Supreme Court whose theories of constitutional
interpretation cannot account for Loving v. Virginia and who cannot say
that Pace v. Alabama was wrong the day it was decided in 1883. The
Justices who cannot explain Loving are the ones who accord primacy to
doctrine and case law, as Chief Justice Roberts seems to do, or Justice
Stephen Breyer, who would defer to the people’s democratically
expressed sentiments. It is Justice Breyer’s approach that leads to Pace v.
Alabama and to Plessy, not Justice Scalia or Justice Thomas’s.
VI. CONCLUSION
At the end of the Civil War, the United States engaged in its greatest
experiment in social change since the Founding. The process of bringing
three million people from slavery to freedom, which some may argue is
still unfinished, was bitterly contested. Building a consensus in a
democracy is difficult by design, but perhaps no struggle has been as
labored or as important as achieving equal rights for Americans
regardless of race. A key problem was the question of exactly what civil
rights had the freed African Americans obtained when slavery was
abolished in 1865. As Senator Lyman Trumbull said during the debates
on the Civil Rights Act of 1866:
It is difficult, perhaps, to define accurately what slavery is and what
liberty is. Liberty and slavery are opposite terms; one is opposed to the
other . . . .
“Civil liberty is no other than natural liberty, so far restrained by human
laws, and no further, as is necessary and expedient for the general
advantage of the public.”262

We contend that by virtue of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
Fourteenth Amendment that the freedmen gained the same right to marry
a white person or to sit in the best railway car on a train as was enjoyed

260. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
261. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
262. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 474 (1866) (Senator Lyman Trumbull’s remarks in
Congress regarding the Civil Rights Bill, Jan. 29, 1866).
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by white citizens. Our position is supported by the text, albeit not by the
legislative history, of the 1866 Act and the Fourteenth Amendment.
We think that legislatures write and pass laws, while it is the job of
the courts to give those enacted texts their objective original public
meaning when judges construe the texts. It is our position that in this
process, courts must interpret the laws according to the plain meaning of
the text as it would have been generally understood by the objective
meaning of its language at the time of enactment. We hold to this
conclusion particularly in times when the plain meaning of the text may
be at odds with the legislative history surrounding its enactment—a view
that is not shared by all jurists, legal scholars, or originalists but that is
associated with the originalism of Justice Antonin Scalia. Unfortunately,
the law of civil rights and of racial equality in the United States is a case
study in the consequences of botched efforts at judicial interpretation. At
multiple critical moments during the struggle for civil rights, faulty
judicial interpretations of legislation and of the Constitution hamstrung
efforts to protect freedom and corrupted the original understanding of the
legislative and constitutional provisions that were before the federal
courts.
Originalists—starting with Raoul Berger, who was an advocate of
original intent—have struggled to construe Reconstruction era legislation
regarding civil rights. This is due to the fact that originalism started out
advocating original intent and only evolved into advocacy of the original
public meaning of legal texts under the intellectual leadership of Justice
Scalia. We think Scalia is right and that Raoul Berger was wrong.
Applying Scalia-style textualism here, we conclude the Fourteenth
Amendment did secure a constitutional right to racial intermarriage.
Lawmaking and constitution-making are public acts. Words in a
proposed statute or constitutional amendment must be given their
original public meaning because it is that meaning that would have led
constituents to speak about proposed laws and voice their preferences to
their elected representatives, and it is that meaning that might have led to
the offering in Congress of proposed amendments. In communicating
legislative preferences to their elected representatives, constituents can
only act on the basis of giving the proposed text its original public
meaning. The secret “understandings” of legislators about what a text
“really” means will not be known to the democratic polity whose
representative will enact a text and then enforce it in the executive and
judicial branches. After all it is “We the People” acting through “Our”
elected representatives who determine whether or not legislation will
1470
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pass in Congress and be signed by the President. A bill may mean one
thing to a senator or congressman, but it is the original public meaning of
a bill that will determine the public’s view of the bill and therefore a
representative’s vote. It is for this reason that courts ought to rely more
on dictionaries than they do on legislative history. A congress that knows
that courts will interpret what it passes literally will take more care in
drafting bills and will pay more attention to precision in legal texts. In
contrast, a congress that thinks courts will pay attention to legislative
history will become sloppy in drafting legal texts. It is the text and not
the legislative history that is voted on in both Houses of Congress and
which the President signs or vetoes. We should employ rules of statutory
and constitutional construction that give Congress an incentive to pay
attention to the texts that it passes.
We have discussed above the fundamental change in Supreme Court
doctrine that occurred between the holding in Pace v. Alabama and
Plessy v. Ferguson263 and the contrary holding in Loving v. Virginia,
which overruled Pace. It is commonly thought that Scalia-style
originalism cannot explain or justify the outcome in Loving v. Virginia.
We think we have shown in this Article that this is not the case. The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 gave African
Americans the same right as is enjoyed by white citizens either to marry
a white citizen or to contract to ride in a certain railway car on a train.
Pace v. Alabama and Plessy v. Ferguson were thus both wrong on the
day they were decided as well as being wrong on May 17, 1954, when
Brown v. Board of Education was decided.264 No evolution in
constitutional meaning was needed to justify Brown or Loving v.
Virginia. The Fourteenth Amendment mandates color blindness as to all
civil rights and has done so from the time of its adoption in 1868. It is
Scalia-style originalism that explains Loving v. Virginia just as it is the
advocates of legislative history who cannot explain that great case.

263. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
264. We believe segregation in public schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment as well as
racial restrictions in contract law violated that amendment. The argument is sufficiently complex,
however, to require treatment in a separate, additional law review article, which we are now in the
process of writing.
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